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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case originated in a Utah state court after Defendants defaulted on a $300,000 loan
made by International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. The action was filed in the Third Judicial
District Court, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, ended in a default judgment against
Defendants, and later led to judgment enforcement proceedings in Idaho, including a foreclosure
action and a writ of execution. These enforcement actions led Defendants to file a motion in the
enforcement proceedings to compel the filing of a satisfaction of judgment, contending that
Plaintiff s judgment has been satisfied through its judgment enforcement proceedings. The
lower court initially denied Plaintiffs motion to dismiss Defendants' motion to compel the filing
of the satisfaction of judgment, and then later reconsidered that decision, and dismissed
Defendants' motion to compel the filing of a satisfaction of judgment. This appeal followed that
decision.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below

This case originated in a Utah court when Defendants defaulted on payment of a
$300,000 loan from Plaintiff International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. Defendants defaulted in
that action, and the Utah court thereafter entered a default judgment against Defendants for
$372,138.13, plus interest on the total judgment at 30% per annum. Tr., p. 14-15. The Utah
Court also found that Defendants procured the loan through fraud and/or misrepresentation. See
id.

On January 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Idaho lawsuit, designated as case number
CV-2012-139 in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Bingham County (the "Idaho Case I").
This action named Defendant B.T.G. Investments, LLC as the sole defendant and sought to
foreclose upon property that was used to secure the underlying debt of $300,000. Tr., pp. 34-35.
The Court in Idaho Case 1 issued a Writ of Execution for Foreclosure of Real Property
requiring the Bingham County Sheriff to sell the Property at a foreclosure sale. The Bingham
County Sheriff noticed the sale for April 27, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff purchased the Property
at the foreclosure sale, tendering a credit bid of$59,200.00. Tr., p. 35.
On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff domesticated the Utah judgment in Idaho pursuant to Idaho
Code § 10-1301 et seq., and then subsequently sought a charging order against companies in
which Defendants owned interests. Tr., p. 12,23-24. This second Idaho action was assigned
case number CV-2012-658 (the "Idaho Case 2"). In response to Idaho Case 2, Defendants filed a
Motion to Compel Plaintiff to File Satisfaction of Judgment. Tr., p. 35. The basis for their
motion and supporting memorandum is that by foreclosing on the Property in the Idaho Case 1,
Plaintiff received something of value that was equal to or exceeded the amount ofthe underlying
Utah judgment. Defendants argued that the domesticated jUdgment was satisfied through the
sale of the Property. To prevent further judgment collection proceedings, including the
enforcement of the earlier Charging Order, Defendants sought and were granted a Preliminary
Injunction on July 12,2012. Tr.,27.
In response to the motion to compel, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendants' Motion to

Compel Plaintiff to File Satisfaction ofJudgment and Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike. The
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Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike by way of its decision filed
November 8, 2012. A true and correct copy of the trial court's November 8,2012 decision is
attached at Appendix "A." See also Tr., pp. 33-40.
Prior to the Court's decision on November 8, 2012, on October 4,2012, the Court
conducted a trial, where the parties called witnesses and presented evidence on the issue of the
value of the Property that Plaintiff had foreclosed upon on April 27, 2012. Tr., pp. 29-32.
Because the parties were unable to complete the presentation of evidence on October 4,2012, the
Court re-scheduled the second day of the trial for December 6, 2012. Tr., p. 30. This second day
of trial was eventually stricken by the Court by virtue of its decision granting Plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration which was entered on May 30, 2013. A true and correct copy of the trial
court's Decision on Motion to Reconsider is attached as Appendix "B".
On June 21,2013, the trial court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and dismissed
Defendants' motion to compel filing of satisfaction of judgment. Tr., p. 41-42. In its judgment,
the trial court also dismissed the Order granting Defendants a preliminary injunction that had
been entered by the Court on July 12, 2012.
Defendants filed timely Notice of Appeal on July 26,2013. Tr., pp. 43-46.
C.

Concise Statement of Facts

On July 1,2011, Defendant B.T.G. Investments, Inc. ("BTG"), received a $300,000.00
loan from Plaintiff International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. ("IRES"). See App. C,

~

7; Tr., pp.

14-15; 20-22; 34. In addition to BTG executing a promissory note in that amount, Defendants
Gordon Arave, Thomas Arave, and Brent Arave (collectively, the "Araves") personally
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guaranteed the loan's repayment. See id. Additionally, as security IRES received a trust deed
upon real property o\\<ned by BTG and located at 55 Rich Lane, Blackfoot, Idaho (the
"Property"). See id. The personal guaranty signed by the Araves stated as follows: "This
Guaranty shall be effective and remain in full force and effect until all Obligations are paid and
performed in full .... " See App. C, p. 20, ~ 5(a).
BTG defaulted on its repayment obligations loan. In November 2011, IRES filed a
lawsuit against the Araves in Utah's Third District Court. That lawsuit was assigned case
number 110919057 (the "Utah Action"). App. C. The lawsuit in Utah did not name BTG as a
defendant. App. C; Tr., p. 34. On March 1, 2012, the Utah Third District Court entered a
judgment against the Araves for $372,138.13, together with 30% annual interest until paid in full
(the "Utah Judgment"). Tr., p. 14.
In the Utah Action, Plaintiff alleged at paragraph 19 as follows: "Plaintiff is starting the
process to foreclose its security interest in the property. Any judgment obtained prior to the
property being foreclosed should be offset by the amount received by the Plaintiff at the
foreclosure sale." See App. C, p. 3, ~ 19. At the hearing before the trial court on Plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration, the Court was aware of the allegation at paragraph 19 of the
complaint in the Utah Action. See App. D, Tr., p. 20, L., 8-25.
On January 18,2012, IRES filed a lawsuit in this Court designated by Case Number
CV-12-139 (the "Idaho Case I"). Tr., p. 34. The Foreclosure Action named BTG as the sole
defendant and sought to foreclose upon the Property. On March 1, 2012, the trial court issued a
Writ of Execution for Foreclosure of Real Property requiring the Bingham County Sheriff to sell
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the Property at a foreclosure sale. The Bingham County Sheriff noticed the sale for
April 27, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. Tr.,34-35.
IRES purchased the Property at the foreclosure sale. At the time of the sale, the Property
was worth approximately $500,000.00. Furthermore, at the time ofthe sale, paying tenants
occupied the Property. Tr.,31-32. After purchasing the Property, however, IRES gave every
tenant a notice to vacate the premises. Thus, as a result ofIRES' actions, the Property, shortly
after the foreclosure sale, sat vacant.
On April 3, 2012, IRES filed another lawsuit in this Court, designated by Case Number
CV-12-658 (the "Idaho Case 2"). Tr., p. 35. In the Idaho Case 2, IRES domesticated the Utah
Judgment and sought entry of a charging order against ten limited liability companies in which
the Araves have interests. Tr., p. 35.
On October 4,2012, the trial court conducted a bench trial, wherein the parties presented
evidence of the value of the Property that was the subject of the foreclosure action. Tr., pp.
29-32. The evidence presented at that hearing is not relevant to the issues on this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration arising

from the trial court's earlier denial of Plaintiffs motion to dismiss Defendants' motion to
compel satisfaction of judgment?
2.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Defendants' motion to compel satisfaction of

judgment?
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3.

Did the trial court err in interpreting and applying the Idaho foreign judgment

collection statute, Idaho Code §1O-1302, in granting Plaintiffs motion to reconsider?
4.

Whether the only avenue Defendants Arave have in challenging the satisfaction of

the Utah judgment is in the Utah court?
These issues were preserved for review on appeal, as they were addressed and resolved
by the trial court in its Decision on Motion to Reconsider dated May 30, 2013. See Appendix B.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review over a trial court's application and construction of
statutes. See State v. Cordingley, 154 Idaho 762, 302 P.3d 730 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Reyes,
139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P .3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction. See State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999);
State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute

is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at
219.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
The law in Idaho is clear: a reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or

additional facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. See JI Case

Company v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 280 P.2d 1070 (1955). Neither of these elements existed
to support the trial court's granting Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration.
This case, and its sister, revolve around one common nucleus of operative facts, i. e.,
Plaintiffs lending of $300,000 to Defendant B.T.G. Investments, Inc., which was guaranteed by
three other defendants, Gordon Arave, Thomas Arave, and Brent Arave. It is undisputed the
total judgment owing to Plaintiff before the foreclosure on the property at issue, including
amounts for fraud, was $372,138.13, together with 30% annual interest until paid in full.
The trial court's decision granting Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is erroneously
based on the premise that Defendants, through seeking an order compelling the filing of a
satisfaction of judgment, are challenging the underlying merits and amount of the Utah
judgment. This premise appears to be based upon Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330
(S. D. 1987), wherein that court stated that "[n]o defense may be set up which goes to the merits
of the original controversy, or which might have been interposed in the original action." See id.,
at 333.
Contrary to the trial court's reasoning, by seeking the filing of a full satisfaction of
judgment, Defendants are not seeking to challenge or otherwise reverse the Utah judgment, the
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basis upon which it was entered, or to otherwise challenge the Utah court's entry of that
judgment. Instead, Defendants have raised the defense of satisfaction of judgment, which is a
defense under Idaho foreign judgment statute. See Idaho Code § 10-1302. And this defense is
based on the evidence that was being presented by the parties at the trial in this matter, which
related to the value of the Property that was foreclosed. Tr.,29-23. Defendants should be
allowed to pursue their case in chief in that trial by showing that the Utah judgment, which was
subsequently domesticated in Idaho, has been fully satisfied by virtue of Plaintiffs foreclosing
on the Property as part of its execution proceedings on the Utah judgment. Any other result
would enable Plaintiff to seek and obtain a double recovery.
II.

THAT DEFENDANTS GORDON ARA VE, TOM ARAVE, AND BRENT ARAVE
DID NOT HAVE OWNERSHIP IN THE PROPERTY THAT WAS
FORECLOSED IS IRRELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING
SATISFACTION OF THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT.
At page 6 of the trial court's decision granting Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration,

Appendix B hereto, the trial court stated:
While the Araves have raised satisfaction of the judgment as an issue, their
argument really relates to the underlying obligation upon which the judgment is
based. This is not an acceptable defense as provided by law. This Court does not
have the power to inquire into the nature, amount, or other merits of the Utah
judgment but must look only to the amount of the judgment and whether that
amount has been satisfied. There is no evidence that the Araves had any
ownership interest in the Property. There is therefore no basis for the judgment
being satisfied.

See Decision, at 6, Appendix B hereto (emphasis added). While it is not disputed in this appeal
that the Araves did not have an ownership interest in the Property that was foreclosed upon, it is
undisputed that the Property was foreclosed upon as part of Plaintiffs efforts to collect on the
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Utahjudgment. The Property collateralized the loan from Plaintiff to Defendant B.T.G.
Investments. Therefore, the fair market value of that property at the time of the foreclosure sale
is relevant to determining whether Plaintiff's judgment against Defendants has been satisfied.
The plain language ofIdaho's foreign judgment collection statute supports Defendants'
position:
A copy of any foreign judgment certified in accordance with the act of congress
or the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any district
court of any county of this state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the
same manner as a judgment of the district court of this state. A judgment so filed
has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district court of
this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner ....
Idaho Code § 1302 (emphasis added). Defendants therefore should be allowed to put evidence
into the record that proves Plaintiff has received a full satisfaction of his Utah judgment.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON NOVEMBER 8 WAS THE CORRECT
DECISION AND THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR RECONSIDERING THAT
DECISION.
The trial court was correct when it ruled on November 8, 2012 that where a party has

pursued two defendants to recover from the same occurrence, "'[a] party may pursue one or all
of the remedies so long as he obtains but one satisfaction.'" See November 8, 2012 Ruling, at 6
(quoting Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1067,695 P.2d 1201,1206 (1984) (emphasis
added).
The rationale for this rule is that the remedy provided to an injured person is to receive
only one full compensation for the wrong done to him. See United Book Press, Inc. v. Maryland

Composition Co., Inc., 786 A.2d 1, 8 (Md. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, when a party has two
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judgments from two debtors, but both debts arise out of the same occurrence, the payment by one
"extinguishes the judgment" for all other judgment debtors. See Hageman/Fritz, Byrne, Head &
Harrison, L.L.P. v. Luth, 150 S.W.3d 617,623 (Texas Ct. App. 2004). Where less than the full

amount is paid, compensation paid to the plaintiff by one indebted "is deducted from the award
obtained from another." Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 108 Cal. App. 4th 47,52 (Ca. Ct. App. 2nd 2003).
Defendants are not arguing or contesting the award of the Utah Judgment or the factual or
legal basis for that award. Defendants are contesting, however, Plaintiff s improper postjudgment attempts to receive via the Foreign Judgment Action double the value of the Utah
Judgment. This is entirely consistent with the guarantors' rights under the guaranty agreements.
Under each guaranty, Plaintiff and Defendants agreed that the Guaranty shall be effective and
remain infullforce and effect until all Obligations are paid and perfOrmed in full . ... " See

App. C, p. 20,

~5(a)

(emphasis added). Thus, the parties contemplated that once the underlying

loan obligation was satisfied in full, the obligations arising by virtue of the guaranty agreements
would be released. Based on this plain language, the guarantors are clearly entitled to show that
Plaintiff s civil judgment has been fully satisfied since the guarantors' obligations under their
guaranty agreement are no longer effective and without force and effect once the obligation to
Plaintiff has been "paid and performed in full." Id.
Plaintiff s complaint in the Utah Action demonstrates further that it contemplated
providing Defendants with a credit toward any judgment based on the amount received at the
foreclosure sale. Paragraph 19 of that complaint alleges that "[a]ny judgment obtained prior to
the property being foreclosed should be offset by the amolmt received by the Plaintiff at the
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foreclosure sale." This allegation merged into the Utah judgment as a result of Defendants'
default in the Utah Action. Plaintiff is therefore bound by its allegation, and any judgment it
obtained in Utah and then domesticated in Idaho should be offset by the value of the property
that was foreclosed upon. See App. D, Tr., p. 20, L. 3-25.

CONCLUSION
The November 8, 2012 Ruling denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss was based on a
correct analysis of governing law. The trial court's subsequent reversal of that decision is based
on an erroneous assessment of the nature of Defendants' claims, wherein they seek the Idaho
court to compel Plaintiff to file a full satisfaction of judgment. The trial court's May 31, 2013
decision should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for trial on the
issue of the Property's fair market value on the date of foreclosure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20 th day of November, 2013.
KIRTON McCONKIE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of November, 2013, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and faxed,
to the following:
Jack H. Robison
JONES, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 967/203 S. Garfield
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0967
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Facsimile: (208) 232-5962
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE
SOLUTIONS, INC., a Utah corporation
Plaintiff~

Case No. CV..2012-139

vs.
¢

BTG INVESTMENTS~ INC., an Idaho
corporation"

DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND/OR STRlKE

Defendant
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE
SOLUTIONS, INC.~ a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
Case No. CV-2012-658

vs.
GORDON ARAVE, mOMAS A.F.AVB,
and BRENT ARAYE.
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and/or

Strike on October 4, 2012. Andrew Wayment appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Richard
Armstrong appeared on behalf of the Defendants. The Court reviewed the documents submitted
Case No. CV-2012~139 &. CV-2012-658
Decision on Motion to Dismiss
Page 10f8

F-745

NOV-08-12

15:11

FROM-Binlrham Cr ·ty Courts

208-795-8057

T-603

P.002/00S

by the parties, heard oral argument from counsel, and took evidence in the form of witness

testimony and exhibits. The Court then took the matter under advisement. The evidence and
issues presented at the October 4 hearing concern matters in both CV-2012-139 and CV-2012658. This decision applies in both cases. The Court now issues its decision on PlaintifPs
Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEQURAL HISTORY
There are twO separate lawsuits before the Court that stem from the same occurrence of

events. On July 1; 2011, BTG Investments, Inc.

("BTGt')~

received a $300)000.00 loan from

International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. ("International"). In addition to BTG executing a
promissory note in that amount, Gordon Arave, Thomas Arave, and Brent Arave (collectively,
the '4Araves") personally guaranteed the loan's repayment Additionally, as secwity, BTG gave
International a trust deed upon real property owned by BTG and located at 55 Rich Lane,
Blackfoo~

Idaho (''the Property").

BTG defaulted on its repayment obligations. In November 2011, International filed a
lawsuit against the Araves in Utah's Third District Court. t The lawsuit in Utah did not name
BTG as a defendant, but only proceeded against the Araves as guarantors under the Guarantee
Contract. On March 1, 2012, the Utah Thlrd District Court entered a judgment against the
Araves for $372, 138.13, together with 30% annual interest until paid in fulL
On January 18, 2012, International flIed a lawsuit with this Court. designated as case
number CV-2012-139. This foreclosure action named BTG as the sole defendant and sought to
foreclose upon the Property. On March 1.2012, this Court entered a judgment against BTG for

$379,626,43 plus 5.25% annual interest. In connection with this judgment, the Court issued a

1 See

Notice of Filing a Foreign Judgment. Exhibit 1.
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Writ of Execution for Foreclosure ofRea1 Property requiring the Bingham County Sheriff to seU
the Property at a foreclosure sale. The Bingham County sheriff noticed the sale for April 27,
2012, at 10:00 a.m. International purchased the Property at the foreclosure sale, tendering a

credit bid of $59,200.00.
On April 3, 2012. International filed another lawsuit in this Court, assigned case number

CV-2012-658. In this case, International domesticated the Utah Judgment pursuant to I.e. § 101301 et. seq. and then subsequently sought a charging order against companies in which the

Araves have interests.

In response, the Araves fIled a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to File

Satisfaction of Judgment, seeking the Court to order International to file a satisfaction of
judgment. The basis of their motion and supporting arguments is that by foreclosing on the

Property, International received something of value that was equal or exceeded the amount of the
debt owed. The Araves argue that any debt they owe International has been satisfied by the
foreclosllfe sale. International disagrees with this position and declares that the Araves do not
have the right to challenge the value of the Property.
DISCUSSION
International's argument rests principally upon the case of First Security Ban.k of Idaho,

N.A., v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988). and its determination that I.C. § 45-1512
does not apply to guarantors.

The Court believes that

I.e.

§ 45-15122 and Gaige: are

distinguishable to the present matter.

2 I.C. § 45-1512 is entitled "Money judgment~Action seeking balance due on obligation," and ntad.s:
At lllly time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of tr\lSt, as hereinbefore proVided, a
money judgment may be sought for the balance due upon the obligation for which sl,lch deed of
trust was given as security, and in such action the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaiI'It the
entire amount of indebtedness which was secured by such deed oftTUst and the amQunt for which
the same was sold and the fair market value at the date of sale together with interest from such
date of sale, costs of sale and attorney's fees. Before rendering judgment the court shall find the
fair market value of the real propll:rty sold at the time of sale. The court may not render judgment
Case No. CV~2012-139 & CV-2012-658
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Gaige is a case in which the bank. sought to collect from Gaige, a guarantor, the amount
due on a promissory note executed by a company.3 The company obtained a line of credit from
the bank and the company's inventory and accounts receivable were used as collateral to secure
the line of credit. Gaige, as president of the company, also signed a personal guaranty for

payments on the company's debts.4 The company got into financial difficulties that made it
unable to pay the line of credit. Gaige informed the bank that he would be forced to liquidate the
company. After discussions with Gaige, the bank entered into a workout agreement with the
company. The workout agreement provided that the company would give the bank a deed of
trust on its building and the bank, in tum, would give the company several additional months to

have a more orderly liquidation of its assets in order to meet its debt obligations to the bank. The

orderly liquidation, however, did not produce enough to satisfy all of the indebtedness. As a
result, the bank foreclosed non-judiCially on the deed of trust and the building was sold by the
trustee to the bank, who was the highest bidder.

After the foreclosure; there was still a

substantial sum outstanding. No deficiency judgment was sought against the company; instead
the bank sued Gaige on the personal guaranties for the balance owing. Gaige raised I.e. § 451512 as a defense. claiming that it precluded the bank from bringing the action on the guaranties.
The Supreme Court determined that I.e. § 45-1512 does not apply to claims by a guarantor.
Instead. the Court said the statute "applies to claims by a creditor secured by a deed of trust for
the balance due after a deed of tnl$t sale. The protection in I.C. § 45-1512 is given to the

for more than the amount by which the entire amount of indebtedness due at the time of sale
exceeds the fair market value at that time. with interest from date: of $;1le, but in no evellt may the
judgment exceed the difference between the amount for whiclt such property was sold and the
entire amount of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust.
l First Security Bank ojldaho, N.A., v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 112. 113, 765 P.2d 683, 684 (l988).
41d.

Case No. CV-2012-139 &. CV-2012-658
Decision on Motion to Dismiss
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borrower-guarantor who gives the security interest described in the deed of trust." The Court
determined that Gaige, as a goarantor, did not have protection under the statute. s
The situation before the court with BTG and the Araves is not one contemplated by I.e. §
45-1512 and Gaige. International is not seeking a deficiency judgment against the Araves, and

the Naves are not raising I.c, § 45-1512 as a defense. A judgment has already been entered
against the Araves in Utah that has been domesticated to Idaho. I.e. § 45-1512 is for HMoney
judgment-Action seeking balance due on obligation'> and concerns looking at the value of the

property after the sale of a trust deed but" ... [bJefore rendering judgment.. ."

I.e. § 45-1512

does not apply, because the Araves have not raised it as a defense to a deficiency action against
them.
time.

II

A money judgment" is not being sought by International of the Araves at this point in

Instead, the Araves are asking the court to order a satisfaction of judgment by

International~

a different situation than that contemplated by Gaige.

When a judgment creditor has received actual payment of the judgment or some other
equivalent method of payment, the judgment creditor may ask the court to order the judgment
creditor to record a satisfaction of judgment.6 Idaho courts have been clear that "Generally, if the
judgment creditor is the purchaser at an execution sale and bids the whole amount due on the
judgment, the judgment is satisfied in fuU:,7 However, it appears one of first impression in
Idaho where the judgment creditor purchases less than the amount due on the judgment and
subsequently the judgment debtor seeks satisfaction of judgment under I.R.C.P. 58(b).
Idaho Courts are clear that the debtor may file a motion to compel acknowledgment of
satisfaction of ajudgment.8 The motion will only be granted upon a showing that the judgment

S First Security

Bank of Idaho. N.A_. v. Gaige. US Idaho 172,765 P.2rl 683 (1988).
Boller v. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc., 119 Idaho 1060,812 P.2d 1221 eel. App. (990).
, Soller v. Sun VaJIeyShamrock Resources, Inc., 119 Idaho \060, 1065.812 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Ct. App. (990).
II Boller v. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc., 119 Idaho 1060.812 P.2d 1221 (Ct. App. 1990).
Case No. CV~2012-139 & CV-2012-6S8

6

Decision on Motion to Dismiss
Page 5 of8

F-745

NOV-DH2

15:12

FROM-Bingham

r . ty

Courts

208-785-8057

T-603

P,006/008

satisfied. 9 Other courts ha.ve determined that the burden of proof is upon the judgment

has

debtor to show that the judgment debt has been paid and should be marked as satisfied.
Where a party has pUl'sued two defendants to recover but it results from the same
occurrence, the courts have said, "A Party may pursue one or all of the remedies so long as he
obtains but one satisfaction."lo "The rationale for this rule is that the remedy provided to an
injured person is to receive only one

fun compensation for the wrong done to him.!!ll Thus.

when a party has two judgments from two debtors, but both debts arise out of the same
occurrence; the payment by one "extinguishes the judgment" for all other judgment debtors.!2
Where less than the full amount is paid, compensation paid to the plaintiff by one indebted "is
deducted from the award obtained from another.,,13
The Naves have filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to File Satisfaction of Judgment,
dated May 15,2012. This is

l'tL"1

allowable procedure under the laws of the state ofIdaho. The

basis oftbe Araves? argument is that by selling the Property in CV-2012-139, International has

received something of value worth more than that credited at the foreclosure sale.

While the

sale of the Property occurred in CV-2012-139. the basis of the Araves' liability is the Guaranty
Agreement that they signed to answer for the debt of BTG, arising out of the same transaction
'With BTG. It is in violation ofIdaho law to allow International to get a double recovery against

both BTG and the Araves from the same occurrence. where International has suffered but one
wrong. There is nO doubt that International should be made whole, but International has no right
to receive more than that amount it is owed. The only way for the Court to determine how much
if any International is still owed is to determine how much the value of the Property is worth.
Noe, 54 A.D.3d 733, 734 (NY App.2~d 2008).
Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 IdahQ 1062. 1067,695 P.2d 1201, 1206 (1984)_
II United Book Press, Inc. 1.'. Maryland Composition Co_. Inc., 786 A.2d 1,8 (el App. MD 2001).
11 Hageman/Fritz, Byrne, head& Harrison, LL.f. v, LUlh. 150 S.W.3d 617, 623 (Texas App_ 2004).
od
13 Neubauer v. Goldfarb, lOS CalApp,411i 47,52 (CA App.2 2003).

9 Malik 1.'_
10
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I.e. § 45-1512 and Gaige do not preclude the Araves from huving their motion heard by
the court. The burden of proof going forward will be upon the Araves to show that the judgment

entered against them in CV~2012-658 has been satisfied by the foreclosure sale of the Property in
CV-2012-139. t4
CONCLUSION

International has failed to convince this Court that their Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike
is appropriate_ I.e. § 45-1512 and Gaige, are not applicable because International is not seeking
a deficiency judgment, and the Araves are not raising

Le § 45-1512 as <'i defense. The

Courl

therefore denies the Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike. The real issue in these cases is Lhe issue of
double recovery and that issue requires the Court to go forward with the evidentiary hearing that
beuan on October 4,2012.. and was continued to a later date.
~

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

o.(~

CL

day of November, 2012.

~
District Judge

1~ Not at issue currently. but something this Court must a.ddress in the future is what amount was recovered by
foreclosing on the Property, and how the court determines the value of the Property: the depressed purchase price,

the fair market value, or some other method.
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and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
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Andrew M. Wayment
WRIGHT & WAYrvIENT, PLLC
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 109
P.O. Box 50578
Idaho Falls; Idaho 83405-0578
Richard J. Armstrong
KIRTON McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE
SOLUTIONS, INC., a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
Case No. CV-2012-139
VS.

BTG INVESTMENTS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

DECISION ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Defendant.
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE
SOLUTIONS, INC., a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2012-658
VS.

GORDON ARAVE, THOMASARAVE,
and BRENT ARAVE,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on April 19, 2013 for a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion
to Reconsider. The issues presented at the April 19 hearing concern matters in both CV-2012139 and CV-2012-658. Jack Robison appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Richard Annstrong
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appeared on behalf of the Defendants. The Court reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties
and heard oml argument from counsel on the motion. The Court then took the matter under
advisement. The Court now issues this decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The difficulty in this case arises from two separate Idaho lawsuits that stem from the
same occurrence of events and the sequence in which they were initiated. On July 1,2011, BTG
Investments, Inc. ("BTG") received a $300,000.00 loan from International Real Estate Solutions,
Inc. ("International"). In addition to BTG executing a promissory note in that amount, Gordon
Arave, Thomas Arave, and Brent Arave (collectively. the "Araves") personally guaranteed the
loan's repayment. Also, BTG gave International a trust deed, as security, upon real property
owned by BTG and located at 55 Rich Lane, Blackfoot, Idaho ("the Property").
BTG defaulted on its repayment obligations. The first thing that International chose to do
was file an action against the Araves under the Guarantee Contract in Utah's Third District
Court, on November 14,2011. 1 In International's Complaint, it requested $300,000 in principal,
plus accrued late fees, pre- and post- judgment interest, filing fees, attorneys' fees and costs, for
a determination that the loan was procured through fraud or misrepresentation, and for such other
and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.2 The Utah Court, based upon the Araves
default, entered a Final Judgment, filed March 1, 2012.

The Final Judgment awarded

$372,138.13 plus interest on the total judgment at 300iO per annum. The Utah Court also found
that the Araves procured the loan through fraud andIor misrepresentation. 3

I The Utah Case is #110919057. See Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong in Support of Motion to Compel Plaintiff to
File Satisfaction of Judgment, Exhibit I.
2 Affidavit of Richard J. Annstrong in Support of Motion to Compel Plaintiff to File Satisfaction of Judgment.
Exhibit I.

Exhibit 2.
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Then, on January 18, 2012, International filed an Idaho lawsuit, designated as case
number CV-2012-139. This action named BTG as the sole defendant and sought to foreclose
upon the Property.

On March 1, 2012, this Court entered a judgment against BTG for

$379,626.43 plus 5.25% annual interest. In connection with this judgment, the Court issued a
Writ of Execution for Foreclosure of Real Property requiring the Bingham County Sheriff to selt
the Property at a foreclosure sale. The Bingham County Sheriff noticed the sale for April 27,
2012, at 10:00 a.m. International purchased the Property at the foreclosure sale, tendering a
credit bid of $59,200.00.
Next, on April 3, 2012, International domesticated the Utah Judgment in Idaho pursuant
to I.C. §

1O~1301

et. seq. and then subsequently sought a charging order against companies in

which the Araves have interests. This is case number

CV~2012-658.

In response, the Araves

filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to File Satisfaction of Judgment. The basis for their motion
and supporting arguments is that by foreclosing on the Property in case CV-2012-139,
International received something of value that was equal or exceeded the amount of the
underlying debt. The Araves argue that the domesticated judgment is now satisfied through the
sale of the Property.
International flJed in response an Objection to Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to
File Satisfaction of Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike.

The Court denied

International's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike by way ofits Decision filed November 8, 2012. 4
On April 5, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider. That motion asked the Court to
reconsider its Decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike dated November 2, 2012.
International's argument is that the Araves have no ownership interest in the Property sold by the

Decision on Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike.
Case No. CV-2012-139 & CV-2012~658
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sheriff so that value cannot be deducted from the domesticated foreign judgment. The second
contention is that the Utah judgment is a final judgment and the causes of action are merged into
the final judgment. Defendants argue that International is seeking to receive by way of the
Foreign Judgment Action double the value of the Utah judgment.
DISCUSSION
The facts of this case present a quagmire. When BTG defaulted on the loan, International
had several options available in its efforts to be made whole. It could choose

to go after the

Property, as security for its loan, and it could go after the guarantors of the loan.

It chose to first go after the guarantors, the Araves. It was successful in getting a default
judgment in Utah for what appears to be the full amount on the loan. S It then chose to go after
the Property, and the Property was judicially foreclosed.

By judicially foreclosing on the

Property, International recovered something ofvalue. 6
The last step that International took was to domesticate the Utah judgment in Idaho. This
judgment appears to be for the recovery of the entire amount of the loan, but International has
already received the Property, and thus received at least part of what is required to be made
whole. International claims that the Araves could have asserted as a defense in the Utah action
that they were entitled to a credit upon the sale of the Property, but they failed to do 80. 7 The
problem with this argument though is that the sale of the Property did not occur until after the
default judgment had been issued in the Utah matter. The Araves could not have argued that
they were entitled to a credit for a sale that had not occurred. The Property was sold on April 27,
2012. The Utah judgment was entered on March 1,2012.

S

The Court recognizes that the Utah judgment also detennined that the loan was procured by fraud.

The issue of the value of the property is a matter for another day.
7 Reply Memorandum in Support ormation to Reconsider, pg. 5.

6
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The real question before the Court though is can the Court look at the underlying
circumstances of the Utah judgment in determining whether the Court can compel International
to file a satisfaction of judgment or is the Court precluded from looking at anything other than
the final judgment amount and whether that judgment has been satisfied.
Idaho has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (the "EFJA).8
The EFJA provides an expedited procedure for the recognition and enforcement of judgments
rendered in sister states.9 The option of domesticating a foreign judgment through the EFJA is
cumulative with the option of pursuing an action on the judgment. 10 A foreign judgment filed
with a district court clerk's office in accordance with the EFJA is treated for purposes of
enforcement the same as a judgment rendered by an Idaho state court. I I An EFJA filing does not
involve initiating a new case. Under the EFJA the foreign judgment is merely treated in the
same manner as an Idaho judgment by the clerk of the court in which it is filed, and is "subject to
the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as an Idaho
judgment, and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner as an Idaho judgment.

It is settled law, in other jurisdictions, that the power of a state to reopen or vacate a
foreign judgment is more limited than under the rules of civil procedure. 12 When a foreign
judgment has been appropriately filed the available defenses are limited to lack of personal or
subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in procurement of the judgment,
satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that make the judgment invalid or
unenforceable; however, the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be relitigated

s I.C. §§ 10-1301 -10-1308,
<) G & R Petroleum. {nco v. Clements, 127 Idaho 119, 120,898 P.2d 50, 51 (1995).
10 Grazer V. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184, )91 (2012).
II {d.
12 Wooster V. Wooster, 399N.W.2d 330,333 (1987). In Schwillingv. Horne, 105 Idaho 294, 669 P.2d 183 (1983),
Idaho did address a case where the defense of in personam jurisdiction was raised.
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in the state in which enforcement is sought.

'3

Foreign judgments are accorded this deference to

avoid offending the Fun Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. 14
While the Araves have raised satisfaction of the judgment as an issue, their argument
really relates to the underlying obligation upon which the judgment is based. This is not an
acceptable defense as provided by law. This Court does not have the power to inquire into the
nature, amount, or other merits of the Utah judgment but must look only to the amount of the
judgment and whether that amount has been satisfied. There is no evidence that the Araves had
any ownership interest in the Property. There is therefore no basis for the judgment being
satisfied.
This rationale is consistent with other jurisdictions that have held that the existence of an
error or irregularity in the law or facts of the foreign judgment, in the absence of one of the
above grounds for reopening or vacating a foreign judgment, does not constitute grounds on
which a court of the enforcing state may reopen and modify the foreign judgment. 15 Assuming
the necessary procedures are complied with, a foreign judgment must be enforced to its

fun

extent, including any errors or irregularities contained therein. 16
This Court still holds the principle as true that an injured person is to receive only one
full compensation for the wrong done to him. The result that the Court reaches today may seem

irregular insofar as it may allow International to pursue more than it is entitled to receive. 17
However, the Court must give the Utah Judgment the full faith and credit that is required under

13

Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N. W.2d 330, 333 (1987).

H

/d.

15

Matson v. Malson. 333 N.W.2d 862. 868 (1983).

141d.
17

United Book Press,lnc. v. Maryland Composition Co., Inc., 786 A.2d 1,8 (Ct. App. MD 2001).
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law. III Therefore the

believes that the appropriate avenue

the Araves to address

whether their obligation as guarantors has been satisfied is in the Utah District Court.
CONCLUSION
International has cOllvinced this Court that its Motion to Reconsider is appropriate.

Therefore this Court GRANTS International's Motion to Reconsider and GRANTS

International's Motion to Dismiss the Araves' Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this1o.(f.. day of May; 2013.

~--

'n~~~
District Judge

1$ Morgan Guar. Trust eo. a/New Yorkv. Staats, 631 A.2d 631 (pa. Super. 1993).
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.
Jack H. Robison
JONES, CHARTERED
203 S. Garfield
P.O. BOX 967
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0967
Richard J. Armstrong
KIRTON McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

o U.S. Mail

erE-Mail:
Hand Deliver
Qiax: 232-5962

o

oErE-Mail:
U.S. Mail

o H~d Deliver
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APPENDIXC

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicia! District

Benjamin J. Mann, Bar Number 12588
Paul M. Halliday, Jr., Bar Number 5076
Stephen B. Watkins, Bar Number 3400
HALLIDAY & WATKINS, P.C.
Suite 300, Western Financial Center
376 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2886
FILE NUMBER: 37078

NOV 1 4 2011

Attorneys for International Real Estate Solutions, Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
COMPLAINT

INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE
SOLUTIONS, INC,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NUMBER

v.
GORDON ARA VE, THOMAS ARAVE, and
BRENTARAVE

Judge:

tWC10fA \L'1

Defendants.
Plaintiff complains against Defendants and alleges as follows:

PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant, Gordon Arave, is an individual residing in the State of Idaho.

3.

Defendant, Thomas Arave, is an individual residing in the State of Idaho.

4.

Defendant, Brent Arave, is an individual residing in the State of Idaho.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Venue is proper with this court according to the venue provision executed
by the Defendants in the Promissory Note and Guaranty.
6.

Jurisdiction is proper with this court pursuant to the choice of law

provision executed by the Defendants in the Promissory Note and Guaranty.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7.

On July 1,201 1, B.T.G. Investments, Inc., an Idaho corporation (HBTG")

executed a Promissory Note ("Note') in favor of Plaintiff in the principal amount of
$300,000.00, plus fees points, interest and other charges. A copy of the Note is attached
as Exhibit "A".
8.

The Defendants additionally executed a Guaranty where each Defendant

agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the Note amount plus fees, interest and other
charges. A copy of the Guaranty is attached as Exhibit "B".
9.

The Promissory Note was secured by a Deed of Trust, Assignment of

Rents, Security Agreement, and Fixture Filing ("Deed of Trust") with real property
located at 55 Rich Lane, Blackfoot, Idaho.
10.

Pursuant to the Note, BTG andlor the Defendants were to make monthly

interest only payments in the amount of $4,000.00 per month due on the first calendar
day of each month to the Plaintiff.
11.

Pursuant to the Note, BTG andlor the Defendants were to make a balloon

payment on September 29, 2011 to pay the outstanding balance on the principal plus all
fees, unpaid points and any accrued and unpaid interest.
12.

Defendants stated that the proceeds ofthe loan would be used as an

earnest money deposit for a loan of $30,000,000.00 that BTG applied for from a different
lender.
13.

The Defendants represented to Plaintiff that if the larger loan was not

approved, the $300,000.00 would be released from escrow and would be used to
immediately repay Plaintiff.
14.

Defendants failed to timely make the first interest payment on August I,

20 I 1. Defendants made the payment on August 14, 2011.
15.

Defendants failed to timely make the second interest payment on

September 1,2011. Defendants made the payment of September 5,2011.
16.

BTG and the Defendants failed to make the required balloon payment on

September 29,2011 and they have continually refused to fulfill their obligations.
17.

Defendants repeated assurances that the funds were to be used as an

earnest money deposit for a loan were false.
18.

Plaintiff is entitled to ajudgment against each Defendant for $300,000.00

in principal, plus accrued late fees, pre- and post-judgment interest as may be authorized
under Utah law, filing fees, attorneys' fees and costs.
19.

Plaintiff is starting the process to foreclose its security interest in the

property. Any judgment obtained prior to the property being foreclosed should be offse,!'
by the amount received by the Plaintiff at the foreclosure sale.
20.

Plaintiff explicitly gives notice to the Defendants that pursuant to U.C.A. §

57-1-32 that Plaintiff intends to seek full recovery pursuant to the terms of the Note and
Guaranty and reserves the right to amend its complaint after the foreclosure sale to
comply with the provisions ofU.C.A. § 57-1-32.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Guaranty)
21.

Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 20

above, as though fully set forth in this claim for relief.
22.

Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a binding contractual agreement on

July 1, 2011. Plaintiff would loan money to BTG evidenced by the Note which was
executed by BTG and each Defendant, in exchange for the promise of the Defendants to
repay the principal plus interest, fees and other charges.
23.

Plaintiff performed its duties under the Note and Guaranty by providing

the loan to BTG and the Defendants.
24.

Defendants are in material breach of their joint and several obligations to

Plaintiff, by, in part, failing to pay the amount due and owing under the Note.
25.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' material breach of their

obligations under the Guaranty with Plaintiff, as described above, Plaintiff has incurred,
and continues to incur, damages of not less than $300,000.00 in principal, plus accrued
late fees, pre- and post-judgment interest as may be authorized under Utah law, filing
fees, attorneys' fees and costs.
26.

Plaintiffis therefore entitled to judgment against each Defendant, jointly

and severally, as set forth below in the request for relief.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Quasi Contract, Unjust Enrichment and/or Quantum Meruit Claim-All
Defendants)
27.

Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26

above, as though fully set forth in this claim for relief.

t'
vi

28.

If, for any reason the trier-of-fact in this case fails to identify the existence

of enforceable and binding contracts by way of the Guaranty, Plaintiff asserts
alternatively this cause of action, for Quasi Contract, Unjust Enrichment andlor Quantum
Meruit.
29.

Plaintiff provided a loan to BTG and the Defendants and thereby

conferred a benefit upon each of them with the minimum and reasonable expectation of
being compensated in an amount equal to the value of the loan plus interest, fees and
other charges.
30.

Defendants each benefitted from the loan provided by Plaintiff.

31.

Defendants each had an appreciation andlor knowledge of the benefits it

received from Plaintiff.
32.

While having said appreciation andlor knowledge, Defendants accepted

andlor retained the benefits from Plaintiff under circumstances that make it inequitable
for Defendants to retain such benefits without full payment ofthe value of said benefits.
33.

Defendants made representations to Plaintiff that Plaintiff would be

compensated in accordance with the terms of the Note and Guaranty for the loan
provided by Plaintiff.
34.

Among other things, Plaintiff, in justifiable and reasonable reliance on

Defendants' promises to pay, loaned BTG $300,000.00.
35.

All benefits from the services provided by Plaintiff are fully retained by

Defendants.
36.

To permit Defendants to retain the benefits received without requiring

them to fully compensate Plaintiff would result in an unconscionable and unjust
enrichment of each of them at Plaintiff's expense.
37.

Plaintiff did not act as a volunteer or intermeddler in connection with the

loan it furnished to Defendants.
38.

As a result, Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendants in an amount to be

proven at trial but not less than $300,000.00.
39.

Plaintiffis therefore entitled to a judgment against Defendants as set forth

below in request for relief.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Fraud and/or Misrepresentation)
40.

Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 39

above, as though fully set forth in this claim for relief.
41.

From June 28, 2011 to July 1,2011, Defendants Gordon Arave and Tom

Arave made repeated statements that the proceeds from the loan would be held as earnest
money deposit for a larger $30,000,000.00 loan.
42.

The Note, which was acknowledged by all Defendants, explicitly states

that the loan proceeds would be held as an earnest money deposit for a larger
$30,000,000.00 loan.
43.

From June 28, 2011 to July 1,2011, Defendants made repeated assurances

that if the larger loan was not approved, the $300,000.00 loan proceeds would be
immediately returned to the Plaintiff.
44.

Plaintiff loaned the money based solely on the beHefthat ifBTG's larger

loan was not approved the loan proceeds being held in the earnest money account would
be released and immediately returned to the Plaintiff.

45.

Defendants have recently stated that the loan was "actually a sale rather

than a loan".
46.

Defendants made these false statements to Plaintiff knowing that the

statement was false and with the intent to induce Plaintiff to make the loan.
47.

Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs loan proceeds were not held

as earnest money deposit for a larger loan and that BTG and the Defendants have spent
the money or the money is not available.
48.

Plaintiff requests a determination that the loan was procured through fraud

or misrepresentation.

RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court award the following:
1.

For $300,000.00 in principal, plus accrued late fees, pre- and post-

judgment interest as may be authorized under Utah law, filing fees, attorneys' fees and
costs.
2.

For a determination that the loan was procured through fraud or

misrepresentati on.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable

under the circumstances.

DATED this 1I~

day of November, 2011.

btrnnr~
Attorney at Law
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PROMISSORY NOTE
DATE: July 1,2011
DOLLAR AMOIDJT: Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000.00) (the "Note") plus fees, points, interest, and charges.
THE SECURITY ASSET IS KNOWN BY THE STREET ADDRESS OF: 55 Rich Lane Black Foot, Bingham County ID 83221,
and also, (the "COLLA TERAL") for further legal deseription see Exhibit "An attached hereto and made a part hereof.
THE BORROWER(S}: B.T.G. INVESTMENTS,INC., an Idaho eorporation, whose addresses is 1395 NW MAIN, BLACKFOOT,
ID 83221. and Gordon Arave, Thomas Arave, and Brent Arave who are signing on behalf of themselves as guarantors of this Note.
THE LENDER; Intemational Real Estate Solutions, Inc., 6839 Bufflehead Dr., Park City, Utah 84098. Phone (435) 649-6477.
SECURITY IN STRUMENT: This Note is secured by a DEED OF TRUST in first lien position of even date.
TITLE COMPANY: First American Tille Insurance Company.
HISTORY/SUMMARY: The Borrower came to Lender searching for a short term loan for another business transaction it desired to
complete. Borrower wished to place a first deed of trust to secure this loan with property that Borrower owned outright (free and
clear). Borrower represented to Lender that the loan proceeds would be held as an earnest money deposit for a larger $30 Million
Dollar loan for another lender. Accordingly, Borrower wishes to place a loan from Lender in a first trust deed lien position for a
period of 90 days at a 16% intcrest rate, with 10 points pre-paid (nct-funded). Loan amount is $300,000.00. Such terms were
specifically proposed by Borrower to Lender. To further entiee Lender to make the loan, Borrower has provided three (3) additional
personal guaranties for the loan from Gordon Arave, Thomas Arava, and Brent Aravc, personally.
BALLOON PAYMENT DUE DATE: September 29, 20J 1 wherein all principal, fees, unpaid points and any accrued and unpaid
interest shall be due.
PROMISE TO PAY: On the Balloon Payment Due Date (September 29. 2011) Borrower shall retire the Note completely. The Loan
will be aceruing interest on a balance of Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000.00). BtTtG. INVESTMENTS. INC" an Idaho
corporation. Gordon Arave, Thomas Arave. and Brent Arave. jointly and severally. as Guarantors. promise to pay to Lender on or
before the due date. in lawful money Qfthe United States of America. the prinCipal sum orThree Hundred Thousand (S3QO.000.QQ)
plus fees. and interest (and default interest. if applicable), and charges, together with Points on the unpaid principal balance and all
other amounts due hereundcr.
USE OF FUNDS: From closing the Lender will bc paid a fully eamed, payable and non-refundable Lender's Fee equaling 10% of
the loan arnount and the remaining funds will be used as outlined in "HISTORY/SUMMARY" above, and as specified in a
settlement statement executed by Borrower at loan closing.
PAYMENTS: Borrower agrees to make monthly interest only payments to Lender in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. Each
payment will be made on or before the 1'1 calendar day of the month, and will be dcemed late and subject to the Late Fee after the 5"'
day of the month. Borrower agrees to pay Lender, by cashier's check. title company, attorney trust account check, or wire order
made payable to Lender to the address indicated above or by electronic transfer to Lender's bank account, in one payment due at
5:00 p.m. Mountain Time on the Balloon Payment Due Date of this Note secured by the property located at (See Exhibit "An).
Lender must receive all principal not yet paid under this Note together with all accrued interest and any unpaid fees and costs due to
Lender on the Balloon Payment Due Date, unless otherwise agreed mutually in writing or required by applicable law. Payments will
be applied in this order: lSI to any late charges, attorney fees, other fees, 2nd to unpaid interest, and 3rd to unpaid principa\.
BORROWER UNDERSTANDS THAT ALL FEES IF NOT PAID WHEN DUE ARE ADDED TO THE PRINQPAL BALANCE
AND START TO ACCRUE INTEREST WHEN DUE.
INTEREST: Provided Borrower is not in default hereof ("Event of Defuult"), interest shall accrue on the unpaid outstanding
balance, at a rate of SIXTEEN PERCENT (16%) [NTEREST PER YEAR ("Interest Rate") in favor of the Lender. The Interest
Rate shall be computed for the actual number of days in the period for which interest is charged, which period shall consist ofa 365
or 366-day period On an annual basis.
DEFAULT INTEREST: In the Event of Default hereunder (if declared by Lender), interest shall accrue on the unpaid outstanding
balance, at a rate of THIRTY PERCENT (30%) INTEREST PER YEAR ("Default Rate") in favor of the Lender. Borrower
specifically acknowledges, agrees lind certifies that the Default Rate was specifically bargained for in this loan transaction and was
intended by Borrower and is a reasonable rate of interest despite any anything to the contrary contained herein.

POINTS: Are charges to the Borrower by the Lender(s) for various services or fees and are usually associated with origination fees
or points, Lender's fees or points or extension fees or points.
PREPA YMENT: There Is no prepayment penalty If this Note Is paid after that day which Is s!xty (60) days from the date
hereof. In any event, Lender shall be entitled to a minimum of sixty (60) days' worth of interest calculated at the Interest

.R!!!:
LATE PAYMENT: If any payment due (principal, or interest, or fees) hereunder is not received by Lender or its representative
before 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time on that datc which is fivc (5) days from the date such payment is due, Borrower will be charged
and shall be obligated to immediately pay a "Late Fee" equaJ to ten percent (10%) of the amount due.
SURVBY; [fthe Borrower is in possession of a property survey. then the Borrower will provide a copy of the survey to the Lender
within 15 days ofthe funding of the loan.
DEFAULT: The occurrence of any of the following shall be deemed to be an event of default ("Event of Default") hereunder:
a.
failure by Borrowcr to make any payment as herein provided within five (5) days from when due.
b.
the (i) breach of; andlor (ij) failure of Borrower to satisfy any of the covenants and conditions set forth in this Note or the
other Loan Documents, or in any agreement securing or guaranteeing payment of this Note, or in any other agreement or loan
Borrower has with Lender;
c. Any representation or warranty by Borrower herein. any other Loan Document, or in any other infonnation or documentation
provided to Lender, which is materially false, incorrect, or misleading as of the datc made.
d. The occurrence of any event (including, without limitation, a change in the financial condition, business, or operations of
Borrower for any reason whatsoever) that materially and adversely affects the ability of Borrower to perfonn any of its obligations
under this Note or the other Loan Documents.
e. Borrower (i) is unable or admits in writing to Borrower's inability to pay Borrower's monetary obligations as they become due
to the Lender or any other creditor, (ii) fails to pay when due any monetary obligation, whether such obligation be direct or
contingent, to any person in excess ofTen Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), unless such obligation is being contested in good faith by
Borrower, as determined by Lender in its sole and absolute discretion (iii) makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors,
or (iv) applies for, consents to, or acquiesces in, the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or other custodian for Borrower or the
property of Borrower or any part thereof, or in the absence of such application, consent, or acquiescence, a trustee, rcceiver, or other
custodian is appointed for Borrower or the property of Borrower or any part thereof, and such appointment is not discharged within
sixty (60) days.
f.
Commencement of any case under the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code, or commencement of any other
bankruptcy arrangement, reorganization, receivership, custodianship, or similar proceeding under any federal, state, or foreign law
by or against Borrower and with respeet to any such case or proceeding that is involuntary, and such case or proceeding is not
dismissed with prejudice within sixty (60) days ofthe filing thereof.
g. Any litigation or proceeding is commenced beforc any govemmental authority against or affecting Borrower, or the property of
Borrower or any part thereof. and such litigation or proceeding is not defended diligently and in good faith by Borrower.
h. A final judgment or decree for monetary damages or a monetary fine or penalty (not subject 10 appeal or as to which the time
for appeal has expired) is entered against Borrower by any govemment authority, which together with the aggregate amount of all
other such judgments or decrees against Borrower that remain unpaid or that have not been discharged or stayed, exceeds Ten
Thousand Dollars ($JO,Ooo.oo), and such judgment or decree is not paid and discharged or stayed or appealed within thirty (30) days
after the entry thereof.
i.
The death or dissolution of any Guarantors, or the incompetency or incapacity of any Guarantors, or the commencement of
,my action or proceeding which seeks as one of its remedies the dissolution of Borrower or any Guarantors.
j.
The Borrower does nol deliver the Fee(s) as the Note requires.
k. All or any part of the property of Borrower is materially attached. levied upon, or otherwise seized by legal process, and such
matenal attachment, levy, or seizure is not quashed, stayed, or released within twenty (20) days of the date thereof.
Upon the occurrence of an Event of Dcfault, Lender has the right, without noticc to Borrower, to immediately aecelerate the Note.
No provision of this Note may be changed, discharged, terminated, or waived except in a writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement of the change. discharge, termination, or waiver Is sought. No failure on the part of Lender to exercise and no delay of
by Lender in exercising any right or remedy under this Note or under the law shall operate as a waiver thereof. IF THIS NOTE IS
INCONSISTENT IN ANY WAY WITH THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF THE TRUST DEED THEN THE LANGUAGE OF
THIS NOTE PREVAILS.
OWNERSHIP AND LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES: Trustor is, and as to any portion of the Property. shall remain the owner of
the Property free and clear of any Liens and Encumbrances. Trustor shall not grant, shall not suffer to exist, and shall pay and
promptly discharge, at Trustor's cost and expense, all Liens and Bncumbrances and any claims thereof upon the Property, or any part

/

thereof or interest therein. Trustor shall notify Beneficiary immediately in writing of any Lien or Encumbrance or claim thereof.
Trustor shall have the right to contest in good faith the validity of any involuntary Lien or Encumbrance, provided Trustor shall firsl
deposit with Beneficiary a bond or other security satisfactory to Beneficiary in such amount as Beneficiary shall reasonably require.
but not more than two hundred percent (200%) of the amount of the claim. and provided further that if Trustor loses such contest,
Trustor shall thereafter diligently proceed to cause such Lien or Encumbrance to be removed and discharged. If Trustor shall fuil to
remove and discharge any Lien or Encumbrance or claim thereof, then, in addition to any other right orremedy of Beneficiary.
Beneficiary may, after only such notice to Trustor as may be reasonable under the then existing circumstances, but shall not be
obligated to, discharge the same, either by paying the amount claimed to be due, or by procuring the discharge of such Lien or
Encumbrance by depositing in a court a bond or the amount claimed or otherwise giving security for such claim, or by procuring
such discharge in such manner as is or may be prescribed by law. Trustor shall, immediately upon demand therefor by Beneficiary,
pay to Beneficiary an amount equal to all costs and e"'penses incurred by Beneficiary in connection with the exercise by Beneficiary
of the foregoing right to discharge any Lien or Encumbrance or claim thereof, together with interest thereon from the date of each
such expenditure at the Default Rate ofInterest under the Promissory Note. Such costs and expenses shall be secured by this Deed
of Trust. "Lien or Encumbrance" and "Liens and Encumbrances" mean, respectively, each and all of the following in respect of the
Property: leases, other rights to occupy or use, mortgages, deeds of trust, pledges, security agreements, assignments, assignments as
security, conditional sales, title retention arrangements or agreements, conditions, mechanics' liens, covenants, and restrictions, and
other charges, liens, encumbrances, or adverse interests, whether voluntarily or involuntarily created and regardless of whether prior
or subordinate to any estate, right, title, or interest granted to Trustee or Beneficiary in this Deed of Trust. Any breach of this
paragraph shall be deemed a material default and Beneficiary shall have all rights and remedies under this Deed of Trust as a result
thereof.
LENDER'S RIGHTS: Time is of the essence hereof. In the event ofany default hereunder, which is not cured within the applicable
notice and grace period (if any), then the whole principal sum plus accrued interest and all other obligations of Borrower to Lender.
direct or indirect. absolute or contingent, now existing or hereafter arising, shall, at the option of Lender. become immediately due
and payable without notice or demand, and Lender shall have and may exercise nny or all ofthe rights and remedies provided herein
and any agreement, securing or guaranteeing payment of this Note as they may be amended, modified or supplemented from time to
time. If Borrower fails to timely pay any amount due under this Note or fails to timely perform any of its duties or obligations under
documents related to this Note, and Lender takes any action to collect the amount due, or to exercise its rights under the related
documents, including without limitation retaining attorneys for collection of this Note, or if any suit or proceeding is brought for the
recovery of all or any part of, or for protection of the indebtedness, or to enforce Lender's rights under any agreement seeming or
guaranteeing payment of this Note, then Borrower agrees to pay all costs and expenses of any such action to collect, suit or
proceeding incurred by Lender, including without limitation reasonable fees and disbursements of Lender's attorneys and their staff
Borrower and any endorser or Guarantors hereof jointlY and severally waive presentment for payment, protest, notice of dishonor
and protest, and consent to any extension of time with respect to any payment due under this Note. and to the addition to or release
of any party. No waiver of any payment under this Note shall operate as a waiver of any other payment.
COLLATERAL: This Note is to be secured by a first position Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents of even date herewith giving
Lender a first TRUST DEED LIEN POSITION in the real property located in County of Bingham, State ofIdaho (See Exhibit UN,),
and also any and all assets covered in the "Security Agreement(s)" signed by the Borrower and guaranteed by any and all
Guarantors(s).
NO USURY; Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Note or in any instrument given to evidence the obligations
evidenced hereby: (i) the rates of interest and charges provided for herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates and charges
which result in interest being charged at a rate equaling the maximum allowed by law; and (ii) if, for any reason whatsoever, Lender
ever contracts for, charges and/or receives as interest in connection with the transaction of which this Note is a part an amount which
would result in inler"'..st being charged at a rate exceeding the maximum allowed by law, such amount, or portion thereof as would
otherwise be excessive interest shall automatically be applied toward reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding
hereunder and not toward payment of interest or fees.
GENERAL CONDITIONS: Upon any change in the terms of this note and unless otherwise expressly stated in writing, no party
Who signs this Note shall be released from liability. Parties herein agree thaI the Lender may release any party or collateral; or
impair, fail to realize upon or perfect Lender's security interest in the collateral; or take any other action deemed necessary by Lender
without the consent of or notice to anyone. This Note is made under the laws of the State of Utah and shall be governed by and
construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of such state. If any term or provision of this Note shall be determined to be
illegal or unenforceable, all other terms and provisions hereof shall nevertheless remain effective and shall be in force to the funest
e"'tent permitted by applicable law.
Borrower specifically represents and warrants to Lender that: (i) this loan is for business or commercial purposes and not for
personal. family or household purposes; (ii) Borrower has had the opportunity to consult with independent legal counsel with respect
to the advisability of executing this Note; and (iii) in executing this Note, Borrower does not rely on any inducements, promises or

representations of Lender or any agent of Lender, other than the tenns and conditions specifically set forth in this Note. This Note
shall be construed as though Borrower and Lender had drafted it together.
THIS NOTE SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED TN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH WITHOUT GIVING EFFECT TO CONFLICT OF LAWS PRINCIPLES and all persons and entities in any manner
obligated under this Note consent to the jurisdiction of any federal or state court within the State of Utah having proper venue and
also consent to service of process by any means authorized by Utah or federal law with respect to any dispute or controversy
hereunder or any aclion to enforce the terms hereof (ifthe collateral is outside ofthe State of Utah then a the foreclosure process will
be govemed under the stale laws and or county laws of where the foreclosure on collateral is located).
BORROWER AND LENDER HEREBY VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, IRREVOCABLY Ah'l) UNCONDITIONALLY
WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY PARTICIPATE IN RESOLVING ANY DISPUTE (WHETHER BASED UPON
CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE) BETWEEN OR BETWEEN BORROWER AND LENDER ARISING OUT OF OR IN
ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS NOTE, OR ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BORROWER AND LENDER. THIS
PROVISION IS A MATERIAL INDUCEMENT TO LENDER TO PROVIDE THE FINANCING DESCRIBED HEREIN.
The Note coupled with the DEED OF TRUST contains the complete understanding and agreement and including all other "Loan
Documents" or potential "amendments" of the Maker and Holder and supersede aJl prior representations, warranties, agreements,
arrangements, understandings, and negotiations.
THIS NOTE AND TRUST DEED REPRESENTS THE FINAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND MAY
NOT BE CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS OR SUBSEQUENT ORAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES. THERE ARE NO UNWRITTEN ORAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES. PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 25-5-4, MAKER IS NOTIFIED THAT THIS NOTE
AND TRUST DEED REPRESENTS THE FINAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND MAY NOT BE
CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF ANY ALLEGED PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS OR SUBSEQUENT ORAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES. THERE ARE NO UNWRITIEN ORAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS NOTE, BORROWER READ AND UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTE,
INCLUDING EACH OF THE INTEREST RATE PROVISIONS, LATE FEES AND PENALTY PROVISIONS. BORROWER
AGREES TO THE TERMS OF THE NOTE, THAT THEY ARE COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE TO BORROWER, AND
ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF A COMPLETED COpy OF THE NOTE. Lender hereby discloses to Title Company, Borrower
and Guarantors that one of Lender's principals. Don Annstrong, is a licensed real estate broker in Utah and Califomia.
ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATIONS TO LENDER. The undersigned hereby represent, warrant, and certify to Lender as follows:
I.
Borrower and Guarantors are each sophisticated businessmen, fully capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
entering into a transaction of this type.

2.
Borrower and Guarantors will directly benefit from the making of the loan evidenced by the Note, and Borrowers
and Guarantors have entered into this transaction in light of Borrower's and Guarantor's express need for the funds represented by
this Note.
3.

Borrower and Guarantors proposed the tenns of the Guaranty and of the Note.

4.
Borrower and Guarantors acknowledge and agree that the Note terms and cost of funds are high but commercially
reasonable in their business opinion, and Borrower and Guarantor consciously chose and intended to consununate the transaction,
and entered into the same without any duress, coercion, or undue influence of any kind whatsoever.
5.
Guarantors specifically and knowingly agree to guaranty payment of the principal amount of the Note at the
interest rates provided therein (at their proposal and election), and hereby guaranty payment of the principal amounts, points, late
charges, fees, Interest, default interest, attomeys' fees and any and all other costs, interest and fees under this Note.
[Signatures on following page]

IN WITNESS THEREOF the Borrower executes this Note to be effective from the date written above.

BORROWER (jointly and severally);
B.T.G INVESTMENTS, INC.,

aBny.I.d~ahO
co oration

~k(

"GORDON ARAVE,

THOMAS ARAVE

Date: July 1,2011

[SignatuTCS must be notarized)

Residing

Exhibit A
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION AND COLLATERAL

That certain real property owned by Trustor and situated in the County of Bingham, State of Idaho described as follows:
A PORTION OF THE

SW~SW!14

OF SECTION 35, TOWNSHIP 2S RANGE

35 E.B.M. BINGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS:

BEGINNING AT A POINT 293.5 FEET EAST AND 33 FEET NORTH OF THE SW CORNER OF SAID
SECTION 35 WHICH IS THE POINT WHERE THE NORTH LINE OF THE COUNTY ROAD
INTERSECTS THE EAST LINE OF THE RIGHT OF WAY OF THE OREGON SHORT LINE
RAILROADj THENCE NORTH 38 18' EAST ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY 324.65 FEET; THENCE
SOUTH 51°42' EAST 60 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 38°18' WEST 276.2 FEET; THENCE WEST
ALONG THE NORTH LINE OF SAID COUNTY ROAD 77.1 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Q

Together with a certain railroad lease adjacent thereto, toget~er with all structures located thereon.
Address of Property: 55 RICH LANE Blackfoot Idaho
and/or,
Parcel or Tax I.D. of Property: Parcel #: RPI332200

EXHIBIT "B"

GUARANTY
THIS GUARANTY (as extended, and renewed from time to time, the "Guaranty"), dated as of July It 1011
between GORDON ARAVE, THOMAS ARAVE, AND BRENT ARAVE, jointly and severally (collectively, as
"Guarantor"), in favor ofINTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE SOLUTIONS, INC., 6839 Bufflehead Dr., Park City, Utah
84098 as lender ("Lender"), in conjunction with a loan for a principal amount of Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000,00)
(the "Notc") plus fees, and interest, and charges, together with Points, Fees, Charges and Interest on the unpaid principal
balance and all other amounts due hereunder, The Note is a combination of Principal, points and interest, made to Borrower
(defined below) by Lender, pursuant to that certain Promissory Note, of even dale herewith, by Borrower to Lender (as
amended, modified, extended, or renewed from time to time).
I.
DEFINITIONS. Except as otherwise provided in this Guaranty, all terms defined in the Note shall have the same
meaning when used in this Guaranty, In addition, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(a)
"Borrower" refers to the borrowing entity named: B.T.G, INVESTMENTS, INC., an Idaho corporation, and Gordon
Arave, Thomas Arave, and Brent Arave. personally.
(b)

"Guaranty" means this Guaranty, as it may be amended, modified, extended, and renewed, from time to time.

(c)
"Note" means that certain Promissory Note, of even date herewith, made by Borrower payable to Lender, evidencing
the Loan (as it may be amended, modified, extended and renewed from time to time), or so much thercof as shall from time to
time be disbursed under the Note.
(d)
"Loan Party" means Borrower and Guarantor, and each other person that from time to time is obligated to Lender
under any Loan Document or grants any of the Collateral.
(e)
"Loan Documents" means this Guaranty, the Note, and all other documents or agreements of either Guarantor or
Borrower that govern. evidence. secure. guaranty, or otherwise pertain to the Loan.
(t)

"Obligations" means the following:
(i)

Payment of principal, interest, costs, expenses, fees, and other amounts under the Note;

(ii) Payment or all other amounts payable from time to lime by Borrower under the Loan Documents; and
(iii) The prompt and complete performance ofthe obligations of Borrower, as set forth in the Note.
2.
GUARANTY. FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, GUARANTOR UNCONDITIONALLY AND
IRREVOCABLY, GUARANTEES THE FULL PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE WHEN DUE, BY ACCELERATION
OR OTHERWISE, OF EACH AND ALL OBLIGATIONS. GUARANTOR AGREES THAT IMMEDIATELY UPON A
FAILURE IN PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE WHEN DUE OF ANY OR ALL OBLIGATIONS, GUARANTOR WILL
PA Y TO LENDER THE FULL AMOUNT OF, OR PERFORM IN FULL, SUCH OBLIGATIONS. ALL PAYMENTS
UNDER TIllS GUARANTY SHALL BE MADE TO LENDER IN LAWFUL MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AT THE ADDRESS OF LENDER AS SET FORTH IN THE NOTE OR SUCH OTHER LOCATION AS
LENDER MAY DESIGNATE IN WRITING. ANY AMOUNT PAYABLE UNDER THIS GUARANTY NOT PAID WHEN
DUE, AND ANY JUDGMENT FOR SUCH AN AMOUNT AND INTEREST THEREON, SHALL BEAR INTEREST AT
THE INTEREST RATE. AND ALSO THE DEFAULT RATE PROVISIONS (IF APPLICABLE), UNDER THE NOTE
FROM THE DUE DATE OR SUCH JUDGMENT DATE, RESPECTIVELY, UNTIL SUCH AMOUNT AND INTEREST
THEREON ARE PAID IN FULL. GUARANTOR AGREES TO PAY SUCH INTEREST ON DEMAND. ALL OF
GUARANTOR'S OBLIGATIONS WILL BE PAID AND PERFORMED BY GUARANTOR WITHOUT
COUNTERCLAIM, DEDUCTION, DEFENSE, DEFERMENT. REDUCTION, OR SET-OFF. THIS GUARANTY IN
GIVEN IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FACf THAT GUARANTOR HAS AN ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE LOAN
BEING MAKE BY LENDER TO BORROWER AND AS A MATERIAL INDUCEMENT TO LENDER IN MAKING THE
LOAN, GUARANTOR'S EXECUTION OF THIS GL'ARANTY IS FREELY GIVEN AND DELIVERED TO LENDER.
3.

GUARANTOR REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES.

Guarantor represents and warrants to Lender as of the date ofthis Guaranty:

(a)
Execution and Delivery and Binding Nature of QUarantor Loan Documents. This Guaranty has been duly authorized,
executed and delivered by or on behalf of Guarantor. This Guaranty constitutes legal, valid, and binding obligations of
Guarantor, enforceable in accordance with its terms against Guarantor.
(b)
Accurate Information. All information in any loan application, financial statement, certificate, or other document. and
all other information previously delivered to Lender by or on behalf of Guarantor in connection with this Guaranty is correct
and complete, and there are no omissions there from that result in any such information being incomplete, incorrect, or
misleading as of the date thereof. Since the date of such information, there has been no change in the assets, financial
condition, or results of operations of Guarantor or any other event or condition with respect to Guarantor that materially and
adversely affects (i) the likelihood of performance by Guarantor of this Guaranty; (ii) the ability of Guarantor to perform this
Guaranty; or (iii) the legality, validity, or binding nature of any of this Guaranty.

(c)
No Armrovals, etc. No approval, authorization. bond, consent, certificate, franchise, license, permit, registration,
qualification, or other action or grant by or filing with any Governmental Authority or other person is required in connection
with the execution, delivery, or performance (other than performance which is not yet due) by Guarantor of this Guaranty.
(d)
No Conflicts. The exccution, delivery, and performance by Guarantor of this Guaranty will not conflict with, or result
in a violation of or a default under, any applicable law, ordinance. regulation, or rule (federal, state, or local); any judgment,
order, or decree of any arbitrator, other private adjudicator, or Governmental Authority to which Guarantor is a party or by
which Guarantor or any of the assets or property of Guarantor is bound; or any agreement, document, or instrument to which
Guarantor is a party or by which Guarantor or any of the assets or property of Guarantor is bound.
(e)
Solvency, After giving effect to this Guaranty, Guarantor is solvent. As used in the preceding sentence, "solven'"
means. with respect to any person, that at the time of determination:
the fair value of its assets, both at fair valuation and at present faif saleable value, is in excess of the total amount
of its liabilities, including, without limitation, contingent claims; and

(i)

(ii)

it is then able and expects to bc able to pay its debts as they mature; and

(iii)

it has capital sufficient to carry on its business as conducted and as proposed to be conducted.

Contingent liabilities (such as litigation, guaranties and pension plan liabilities) shall be computed at the amount which, in
light of all the facts and circumstances existing at the time, represents the amount which can reasonably be expcctcd to become
an actual or matured liability.
(t)
Inducement. Guarantor acknowledges and agrees thai this Guaranty is being executed and delivered in connection
with, and as an inducement for Lender to extend, various credit accommodations to Borrower that are beneficial to the ongoing
business and operations of Borrower and Guarantor, and was made at Borrower and Guarantor's request and proposal.

4.
GUARANTOR COVENANTS. Until the Obligations are paid and performed in full, Guarantor agrees that, unless
Lender otherwise agrees in writing in Lender's sole and absolute discretion:
(a)

Information and Statements. Guarantor shall furnish to Lender the following;
Annual Financial Statements. Upon Lender's written request therefor, the current financial statements of
Guarantor, which shall consist of a balance sheet and income statement as ofthe end of such annual period.
(i)

(ii)
Tax Returns. Upon Lender's written request, and within fifteen (15) days of filing or any extension thereof, but
no later than October 15 of each calendar year, a complete copy of the federal income tax returns of Guarantor, together
with all schedules and attachments thereto, for the immediately preceding tax year, and any extensions pertaining
thereto.

Other lnfonnation. Such information concerning Guarantor and the assets, busincss. financial condition,
operations. property, prospects, and results of operations of Guarantor as Lender reasonably requests from time to time.

(iii)

(d)
Keeping Informed About Borrower and Transaction. Guarantor understands the Obligations, and the Guarantor's
obligations hereunder, and has had access to information about the financial condition of Borrower and the ability of Borrower

to perform the Obligations. Guarantor assumes responsibility for acqumng and maintaining all necessary infol111lltion
concerning the financial condition of the Borrower, and any and all endorsers and olher guarantors of any instrument or
document evidencing all or any part of the Obligations, and of all other circumstanccs bearing upon the risk of nonpayment of
the Obligations or any part thereof that diligent inquiry would reveal, and Guarantor hereby agrees that Lender shall have no
duty to advise Guarantor of information Imown to Lender regarding such conditions or circumstances.
(e)
No Transfer of Assets. Guarantor shall nol sell, convey, transfer, assign. dispose of or further encumber all or
substantially all of its properties or assets, or any right, title or interest therein, or any part thereof, or enter into a lease
covcring all or any portion thereof or an undivided interest therein, either voluntarily, involuntarily, or otherwise, without the
prior written consent of Lender being first had and obtained, which consent may be withheld or conditioned in the sole and
absolute discretion of Lender.
5.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

(a)
Nature of Guaranty. This Guaranty is absolute, continuing, irrevocable, and unconditional. This Guaranty is a
guaranty of payment and performance when due and not of collcction. This Guaranty shall be effective and remain in full force
and effect until all Obligations are paid and performed in full, regardless of (i) the genuineness, regularity, legality, validity, or
enforceability of any or all of the liens and encumbrances scouring thc Obligations, the Loan Documents, or the Obligations,
(ii) any law, regulation, or rule (federal, state, or local) or any action by any Governmental Authority dischuging, reducing,
varying the terms of payment, or otherwise modifying any of the Obligations or any of the liens and encumbrances securing
the Obligations, or (iii) the death, dissolution. or liquidation of Borrower or any Guarantor.
(b)
Enforcement Against Guarantor Without Other Action. Lender may enforce this Guaranty against any Guarantor
without first having sought enforcement of any Loan Documents against BOlTOwer, any other Guarantor, or any collateral.
(c)
PYents Not Affecting Guarantor Obligations. The following shal! not affect, impair, or delay the enforcement of this
Guuanty, regardless of the impact upon any contribution, exoneration, indemnification, reimbursement, subrogation, and other
rights of Guarantor:
(i)
The bankruptcy, death. disability, dissolution, incompetence, insolvency, liquidation, or reorganization of
Borrower.

Any defense of Borrower to payment or perfonnance of any or all Obligations, or enforcement of any or all liens
and encumbrances securing the Obligations or this Guaranty.

(ii)

The disallowance, dischuge, modification of the terms of. reduction in the amount of, or stay of enforcement of
any or all Obligations, or any or all liens and encumbrances securing the Obligations, in any bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, or other legal proceeding or by any law, ordinance. regulation, or rule (federal, state, or local).

(iii)

(iv)

The cessation of liability of Borrower for any or all Obligations.

(d)
Acts and Omissions of Lender Not Affecting this Guaranty. The following acts and omissions shall nol affect. delay,
er impair this Guaranty, regardless of the impact upon any contribution, exoneration, indemnification, reimbursement,
subrogation, er other rights of Guarantor:
Lender may compromise, delay enforcement, fail to enforce, release, settle, or waive any or all Obligations of
Borrower or any or all rights and remedies of Lender against Borrower and may extend, modify or renegotiate any term
and condition of any Obligation of Borrower under the Loan Documents without the prior approval or consent of
Guarantor and without the requirement of Lender giving written notice to Guarantor of any such act.
(i)

(ii)
Lender may make advances, issue letters of credit, or grant other financial accommodations for Borrower without
requiring satisfaction of all conditions precedent in the Loan Documents.
(iii)

Lender may obtain. substitute, and release collateral or additional collateral for the Obligations or this Guaranty.

(Iv) Lender may fail to perfect, fail to protect the priority of. and fail to insure any or all liens and encumbrances in
such collateral.

(v)

Lender may fail to inspect, insure, maintain. preserve. or protect any or all such collateral.

(vi) Lender may enforce, compromise, delay enforcement, fail to enforce, settle, or waive any rights and remedies of
Lender as to any or all such collateral.
Lender may assemble. sell, or otherwise dispose of any collateral in any manner and order Lender determines in
its sole and absolute discretion, and disposition may be for no value, or for less than fair market value. of the collateral
in the sole and absolute discretion of Lender. With respect to any collateral that is personal property, Lender shall give
Guarantor five (5) days' prior written notice of any sale or other disposition, except for personal property collateral that
is perishable, threatens to decline speedily in value, is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, or is eash,
eash equivalents, certifieates of deposit or the like, and except as to Lender's right of set-off. Guarantor's sole right with
respect to all collatcral shall be to bid at a sale thereofin accordance with applicabJe law.
(vii)

(viii) Lender may obtain additional obligors for any Of all Obligations, and may substitute or release Borrower or any
other obligor.
(ix) Lender may fail to file or pursue a claim in any bankruptcy, insolvency. probate, reorganization, or other
proceeding as to any or all Obligations or any or all liens and cncumbrances securing the Obligations.
(x)
Lender may subordinate (A) any or all liens and encumbrances securing the Obligations or this Guaranty, or (B)
any or all Obligations.

(xi) Lender may amend, modify, extend, renew, restate, supplement, or terminate in whole or in par! any or all Loan
Documents.
(xii) Lender may assign any or all of its rights and delegate its obligations under the Loan Documents, in whole or in
part (including, without limitation, by participation).
(xiii) Lender may do any other act or make any other omission that might otherwise constitute an extinguishment or II
Icgal or equitabJe discharge of, or defense by, Guarantor.
6.

GUARANTOR WAIVERS.

(a)
Note and Notice Waivers. Guarantor waives, to the full extent permitted by law. presentment, notice of dishonor.
protest, notice of protest, notice of intent to accelerate. notiee of acceleration, and all other notices or demands of any kind,
including, without limitation, notice of the acceptance by Lender of this Guaranty, notice of the existence, creation, non·
payment, or non-performanee of any or all Obligations, and notice ofthc acls or omissions described in Sections S(c) and Sed),
excepting only notices specifically provided for in this Guaranty.
Waiver of Acts and Qmissions of Lender. Guarantor waives any defense to enforeement of the Guarantor's
obligations hereunder or any liens and encumbrances granted by Guarantor based on acts and omissions of Lender described in
Sections 5(c) and Sed).

(b)

(e)
Waiver of Statutory Provisions. Guarantor waives any and all rights and benefits under the Idaho Code and under
Utah Code Section 78B-6-901, and any other similar or replacement statutes or rules now or hereafter in effeet and any other
statutes or rules noW or hereafter in effect thai purport to confer specific rights upon, or make specific defenses or procedures
available to, guarantors.
(d)
Waiver of Statute of Limitations. To the full extent permitted by law, Guarantor waives any and all statutes of
limitations as a defense to any or all Obligations.
(e)
Waiver of Law and Equitable Principles Conflicting With This Guaranty. Guarantor waives any and all provisions of
law and equitable principles thaI conflict with Ihis Guaranty.
(t)
Waiver of Any Obligation of Lender to Inform Guarantor. Guarantor waives any right to require Lender, and Lender
shall have no obligation, to provide to Guarantor any information concerning performance of the Obligations, the ability of
Borrower to perform the Obligations, or any other matter, regardless of what information Lender may have from time to time.

(g)
Waiver of Contribution, Exoneration, Indemnification, Reimbursement. Subrogation, and Other Rights Against
Borrower and Other Loan Parties. Guarantor waives any and all present and future claims, remedies, and rights of GUllrMtor
against Borrower or any other guarantor, IIny collateral, and any other property, interests in property, or rights to property of
Borrower or any other guarantor (i) arising from any performance by Guarantor hereunder, (ii) arising from any application of
any collateral or any other property, interests in property, or rights to property of Guarlmtor to payment or performance of the
Obligations, or (iii) otherwise arising in respect of the Loan Documents, regardless of whether such claims, remedies, and
rights arise under any present or future agreement, document, or instrument or are provided by any law, ordinance, regulation,
or rule (federal, state, or local) (including, without limitation, (A) any and all rights of contribution, exoneration, indemnity,
reimbursement, and subrogation, and (B) any and all rights to participate in the rights and remedies of Lender against
Borrower, any other guarantor, and any collateral).
(h)

Waiver of Obligation of Lender. Guarantor waives any right to require Lender, and Lender shall have no obligation,
any action or actions against any other Guarantor or Borrower before it brings any action against Guarantor; or, (ii)
commence and complete the foreclosure of any real property or other collateral given as security for the Obligations before it
brings any action against Guarantor under this Guaranty.
10 (i) bring

7.
SUBORDINATION. If from time to time Borrower shall have liabilities or obligations to Guarantor, such liabilities
and obligations and any and all assignments as security, grants in trust, liens, mortgages, security interests, other
encumbrances, and other interests and rights securing such liabilities and obligations shall at all times be fully subordinate with
respect to (i) assignment as security, grant in trust, lien, mortgage, security interest, other encumbrance, and other interest and
right (if any), (ii) time and right of payment and performance, and (iii) rights against any collateral therefor (if any), to
payment and performance in full of the Obligations and the right of Lender to realize upon any or all Collateral. Guarantor
agrees that such liabilities and obligations of Borrower to Guarantor shall not be secured by any assignment as security, grant
in trust, lien, mortgage, security interest, other encumbrance or other interest or right in any property. interests in property, or
rights to property of Borrower and that Borrower shall not pay, and Guarantor shall not receive, payments of any or all
liabilities or obligations of Borrower to Guarantor until after payment and performance of the Obligations in full. If,
notwithstanding the foregoing, Guarantor receives any payment from Borrower, such payment shall be held in trust by
Guarantor for the benefit of Lender, shall be segregated from the other funds of Guarantor, and shall forthwith be paid by
Guarantor to Lender and applied to payment of the Obligations, whether or not then due. To secure this Guaranty, Guarantor
grants to Lender a lien and security interest in all liabilities and obligations of Borrower to Guarantor, in any assignments as
security, grants in trust, liens, mortgages, security interests, other encumbrances, other interests or rights securing such
liabilities and obligations, and in all of Guarantor's right, title, and interest in and to any payments, property, interests in
property, or rights to property acquired or received by Guarantor from Borrower in respect of any liabilities or obligations of
Borrower to Guarantor.
8.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF LENDER. The rights and remedies of Lender shall be cumulative and nonexclusive. Delay, discontinuance, or failure to exercise any right or remedy of Lender shall not be a waiver thereof, of any
other right or remedy of Lender, or of the time of the essence provision. Exercise of any right or remedy of Lender shall not
cure or waive any Event of Default or invalidate any act done in response to any Event of Default.
9.
SURVIVAL. Thc reprcsentations, warranties, and covenants of Guarantor in this Guaranty shall survive the
execution and delivery of this Guaranty.
10.
INTEGRATION, ENTIRE AGREEMENT, CHANGE, DISCHARGE, TERMINATION, WAIVER,
APPROVAL, CONSENT, ETC. This Guaranty, along with the Security Agreement, contains the complete understanding
and agreement of Guarantor and Lender and supersedes all prior representations, warranties, agreements, arrangements,
understandings, and negotiations. No provision of this Guaranty may be changed, discharged, supplemented, tenninated, or
waived except in a writing signed by the parties thereto. Delay or fallure by Lender to insist on performance of any obligation
when due or compliance with any other term or condition in this Gul!rW1ty shall not operate as a waiver thereof or of any other
obligation, term, or condition or ofthe time of the essence prOVision. Acceptance of late payments or performance shaH not be
a waiver of the time of the essence provision, the right of Lender to require that subsequent payments or performance be made
when due, or the right of Lender to declare an Event of Default if subsequent payments or performance are not made when
due. Any approval, consent, or statement that a matter is satisfactory by Lender under this Guaranty must be in writing
executed by Lender and shaJl apply only to the perscn(s) and facts specifically set forth in the writing.
II.
BINDING EFFECT. Thi5 Guaranty shall be binding upon Guarantor and shall inure to the benefit of Lender and
their successors and assigns, and the executors. legal administrators, personal representatives, heirs, devisees, and beneficiaries
of Guarantor, provided. however, that Guarantor may not delegate any of its obligations under this Guaranty and any purported
delegation shall be void. Lender may from time to time in its sole and absolute discretion assign its rights and delegate its

obligations under the Loan Documents, in whole Or in part, without notice 10 or consent by Guarantor (including, without
limitation, participation). In addition to any greater or lesser limitation provided by law, Guarantor shall not assert against any
assignee of Lender any claims or defenses Guarantor may have against Lender, except claims and defenses, if any, arising
under this Guaranty.
12.
COSTS, EXPENSES, AND FEES. Guarantor shall promptly pay to Lender, upon demand, with interest thereon at
the Default Interest Rate, reasonable attorneys' fees and all costs and other expenses paid or incurred by Lender in enforcing or
exercising its rights or remedies created by, connected with or provided for in this Guaranty.
13.
SEVERABILITY. If any provision or any part ofany provision of this Guaranty is unenforceable, the enforceability
of thc other provisions or the other provisions and the remainder of the subject provision, respectively, shall not be affected
and they shall remain in full force and effect.
14.
CHOICE OF LAW. THIS GUARANTY AND THE TRANSACTION CONTEMPLATED HEREUNDER SHALL
BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT
GIVING EFFECT TO CONFLICT OF LAWS PRINCIPLES (REGARDLESS OF THE PLACE OF BUSINESS,
RESIDENCE. LOCATION OR DOMICILE OF ANY GUARANTOR). THE PARTIES AGREE THAT ALL ACTIONS OR
PROCEEDINGS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH THIS GUARANTY AND THE OTHER LOAN DOCUMENTS
SHALL BE TRIED AND LITIGATED ONLY IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS LOCATED IN THE COUNTY
OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH OR, AT THE SOLE OPTION OF LENDER, IN ANY OTHER COURT IN WHICH
LENDER SHALL INITIATE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE PROCEEDINGS AND WHICH HAS SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY. EACH OF LENDER AND GUARANTOR WAIVES, TO
THE EXTENT PERMITTED UNDER APPLICABLE LAW, ANY RIGHT EACH MAY HAVE TO ASSERT THE
DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS OR TO OBJECT TO VENUE TO THE EXTENT ANY PROCEEDING IS
BROUGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION 14 AND SUBMlTS TO THE PROCESS, JURISDICTION AND
VENUE OF ANY SUCH COURT. GUARANTOR ALSO WAIVES THE RIGHT TO PROTEST THE DOMESTICATION
OR COLLECI10N OF ANY JUDGMENT OBTAINED AGAINST GUARANTOR WITH RESPECT TO THIS
GUARANTY OR THE OBLlGA TIONS EVIDENCED HEREBY IN ANY JURISDICTION WHERE ASSIGNOR MAY
NOW OR HEREAFTER MAINTAIN ASSETS. NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED HEREIN TO THE
CONTRARY, GUARANTOR SHALL BE LIABILITY FOR JUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
RATE OF THIRTY PERCENT (30%) PER ANNUM, REGARDLESS OF ANY OTHER PROVISION OF THE NOTE OR
OF ANY STATE LAW TO THE CONTRARY.
15.
TIME OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence with regard to each prOVision of this Guaranty as to which time is
a factor.
16.
NOTICES AND DEMANDS. All notices, requests, demands and consents to be made hereunder to the parties
hereto shall be in writing and shall be delivered by hand or sent by registered mail or certified mail, postage prepaid, return
receipt requested, through the United Statcs Postal Service to the addresses shown on the signature page hereof (or in the Note
in the case of Lender) or such other address which the parties may provide to one another in accordance herewith. Such
notices, requests, demands and consents, if sent by mail, shall be deemed given two (2) Business Days after deposit in the
United States mail, and if delivered by hand, shall be deemcd given when delivered.
17.
JOINT AND SEVERAL OBLIGATIONS. This Guaranty mlly be executed by more than one person, and in such
event the obligations hereunder shall be the joint and several obligations of each such person. Each reference to Guarantor
shall be a reference to each person executing this Guaranty individually and to all such persons collectiVely.
18.
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE. Guarantor's performance of a portion, but not all, of the Obligations shall in no way
limit, affect, modify or abridge Guarantor's liability for the Obligations which are not performed. Without in any way limiting
the generality of the foregoing, in the event that Lender is awarded a judgment in any suit brought to enforce Guarantor's
covenant to perform a portion of the Obligations, such judgment shall in no way be deemed to release Guarantor from its
covenant to perform any portion of the Obligations which is not the subject of the suit.
19.
INDEMNIFICATION OF LENDER. Guarantor agrees to indemnify, hold harmless, and on demand defend the
Lender and its stockholders, directors, officers, employees, agents, and representatives for. from, and against any and all
damages, losselI, liabilities, costs, and expenses (including, without lfmltation, costs and expenses of litigation and reasonable
attomeys' fees) arising from any claim or demand in respect of this Guaranty arising at any time, whether before or after
payment and performance of the Obligations in full, excepting any such matters arising solely from the gross negligence or

willful misconduct of the indemnity. The obligations of Guarantor and the rights of the Lender under this Section 19 will
survive payment and performance ofthe Obligations in full and will remain in full force and effect without teonination.
20.
RESCISSION OR RETURN OF PAYMENTS. If at any time or from time to time, whether before or after
payment and perfonnance of the Obligations in full, all or any part of any amount receivcd by Lender in payment of, or on
account of, any Obligation is or must be, or is claimed to be, avoided, rescinded. of returned by Lender to GUarantor or any
other person for any reason whatsoever (including, without limitation, bankruptcy, insolvency, or reorganization of Guarantor
or any other person), such Obligation and any liens and encumbrances that secured such Obligation at the time such avoided.
rescinded, or returned payment was received by Lender shall be deemed to have continued in existence or shall be reinstated,
as the case may be, all as though such payment had not been received.

21.
CONSTRUCTION. This Guaranty is the result of negotiations between Guarantor and Lender. Accordingly, this
Guaranty shall not be construed for or against Guarantor or Lender, regardless of which party drafted this Guaranty or any part
thereof. The headings at the beginning of each section of this Guaranty are solelY for convenience and are not part of this
Guaranty. In this Guaranty the singUlar shall include the plural and vice versa and each gender shall include the other genders.
22.
COUNTERPART EXECUTION. This Guaranty may be executed in one or more counterparts. each of which will
be deemed an original and all of which together will constitute one and the same document. Signature pages may be detached
from the counterparts and attached to a single copy of this Agreement to physically fonn one document. Copied signature
pages will be acceptable. provided originally signed signature pages are provided to each of the other parties by overnight
courier.
23.
JURY WAIVER. GUARANTOR AND LENDER HEREBY VOLUNTARILY. KNOWINGLY, IRREVOCABLY
AND UNCONDITIONALLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY PARTICIPATE IN RESOLVING ANY DISPUTE
(WHETHER BASED UPON CONTRACT, TORT OR OTIffiRWISE) BETWEEN OR BETWEEN GUARANTOR AND
LENDER ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THlS GUARANTY OR ANY OTHER LOAN
DOCUMENT, OR ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENDER AND GUARANTOR. THIS PROVISION IS A
MATERIAL INDUCEMENT TO LENDER TO PROVIDE THE FINANCING DESCRIBED HEREIN OR IN THE OTHER
LOAN DOCUMENTS.
24.

CERTIFICATIONS TO LEND ER. Guarantors hereby represent, warrant. and certify to Lender as follows:

I.
Guarantors are each sophisticated businessmen. fully capable of evaluating the merits and risks of entering
into a transaction of this type.
2.
Guarantors will directly benefit from the making of the loan evidenced by the Note, and Guarantors have
made this Guaranty in Iight of Borrower's (and Guarantor's) express need for the funds represented by the Note.

3.

Guarantors proposed the teons ofthis Guaranty and ofthe Note.

4.
Guarantors acknowledge and agree that the Note terms and cost of funds are high but commercially
reasonable in their business opinion, and Guarantor conSCiously chose and intended to consummate the transaction, and
entered into the same without any duress, coercion, or undue influence of any kind whatsoever.
5.
Guarantors specifically and knowingly agree to guaranty payment of the principal amount of the Note at the
interest rates provided therein (at their proposal and election), and hereby guaranty payment of the principal amounts, points,
late charges, fees, interest. default interest, attorneys' fees and any and all other costs. interest and fees under the Note.

Lender hereby discloses to Title Company, Borrower and Guarantors (who hereby acknowledge) that one of Lender's
principals, Don Annstrong, is a licensed real estate broker in Utah and California.

[Signatures on following page]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Guarantor has caused this Guaranty to be executed as of the date first above written.

"GUARANTOR":

~

GdRDON ARA VE
52 West 215 North
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
519-58-8725

THOSARAVE

ACKNOWLEDGED, AGREED AND CONSENTED
TO BY AND ON BEHALF OF:

£¢~-

B.T.G INVESTlvlENTS, INC.,
anldaho~

BY:~~

Name:
~~ t1a.Ayy;:,
Its:
;n~£

Dated: July 1,2011

376 North 200 East
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
519·64-9288

1219 Danielle
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
519-74-4502
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Utah judgment which involves -THE COURT: The .atiaves.

3
MR. ROBISON: -- the Araves. And then -- that's the
4 Utah judgment. Then the Idaho judgment involves BTG.
THE COURT: And I think it's that Utah judgment
5
6 that's the subject of your motion to reconsider.
6
MR. ROBISON: That's how I would see it. That's how
7
7
8 I would see it, your Honor.
8
9
9
MR. ARMSTRONG: But just so it's clear, your Honor,
10 CV-2012-139.
10 I mean-11
We are here on plaintiffs motion for
11
THE COURT: They're interhvined.
12 reconsideration regarding a motion to dismiss that was
12
MR. A.R.lYISTRONG: -- there was a decision to
13 ruled on by the Court late last year.
13 consolidate the two matters. Exactly. That's what the
14
14 hearing that we have scheduled for May 2nd deals with,
Mr. Robison, it's your motion. You may go ahead.
15
MR. ROBISON: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor-- 15 are both matters.
16
16
THE COURT: Let me ask first, does it apply to both
THE COURT: And I understand that.
17 files? Both cases?
17
MR. ARMSTRONG: I believe that the motion would
18
MR. ROBISON: Well, that's a good question. I put
18 apply to both matters.
19 both in the heading. I know that Mr. Armstrong only
19
THE COURT: What I'm going to do is let you both
20 used one. I think the motion, if I'm -- I wasn't
20 argue. I just don't want to hear double argument.
21 involved in the procedure, but I think the motion was in
21
MR. ARMSTRONG: Sure.
22 one case, if I'm not mistaken. But I don't know.
22
MR. ROBISON: Okay.
23
THE COURT: I don't think that the fraud elements
23
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Robison.
24 have anything to do ,,\lith the BTG Investment, does it?
24
MR. ROBISON: Your Honor, the motion to reconsider
25
MR. ROBISON: No, it does not. In fact, there's a
25 is based upon, really, two separate factual and legal
1
2
1 analyses. And, frankly, I don't think we need to go
1 better be careful when you bid. Boller involved -- that
2 beyond the first one, in my view. And by going into the
2 case involved the judgment creditor "vith a judgment
3 second one, I don't want the Court to get the inference
3 debtor who had an interest in property that was sold.
4 that I'm attempting to litigate these issues that they
4 Under Rule 58, there's nothing remarkable here. The
5 haven't done, but I can tell the Court what I think is
5 property was sold. The judgment creditor overbid. The
6 the procedure that would have to be followed to get any
6 judgment debtor says, "I get a credit against my
7 type of relief.
7 judgment because you bid in the whole amolmt of your
8
THE COURT: Okay.
8 debt."
9
MR. ROBISON: In the first portion of it, though, is
9
That's all Boller stands for. Boller does not stand
10 that the analysis on the first of that Utah judgment is
10 for anything -- any type of procedure that opens the
11 a final judgment. And it's been recorded. It's been
11 door to the Court to a great equitable inquiry as to a
12 . recognized as a foreign judgment. It's against the
12 judgment or another judgment.
13 Araves. The Araves simply, on this motion, have not
13
We have ajudgmentto the Araves. It's a final
14 shown they had any ownership interest whatsoever in the
14 judgment on its face. And you have an action in Idaho
15 asset, which was ovmed by BTG Investment, sold by the
15 ,"lith a judgment and a sale of an asset of another party
16 sheriff. It's a rather rote question and analysis.
16 who's not a party to that judgment. There is nothing in
17 Therefore, they're not entitled to a satisfaction under
17 there that gives them a credit. As to the Araves'
18 IRCP Rule 58, because the Araves had paid nothing on
18 judgment, they're a third party.
19 their judgment. The motion -- the motion should be just
19
And if you look at Boller, it clearly doesn't give
20 simply on that basis. And the reason is this: The case
20 any jurisdictional ability to the Court to enter that
21 that they've cited for this is the Boller casel Sun
21 inquiry. There is no authority. And that's -- the
22 Valley case.
22 Court in its decision relied heavily on Boller as saying
23
23 that the process of filing for satisfaction of judgment
THE COURT: Yes.
24
MR. ROBISON: It is readily distinguishable. In
24 is an appropriate process in Idaho.
25 fact, Boller doesn't stand for anything other than you
25
It's just -- to me, it's just very straightforward
3
4
3
4
5

THE COURT: All right. We're here on International
Real Estate Solutions versus Arave and versus BTG;
correct?
MR. ROBISON: Correct.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Correct.
THE COURT: All right. File number for the Arave
case, it's CV-2012-658. For the BTG Investment, it's
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and simple: Did the Araves have any property that they
oV,.'TIed, had an interest in, that 'vvas sold? No. It's not
their money; therefore, they've paid nothing on their
judgment.
If you look at Rule 58, it says, "Upon full payment
ofthe judgment, the party in whose favor the judgment
was rendered shall have the duty to record a
satisfaction. Araves have paid nothing on their
judgment. vv'bat they're looking for is something
entirely different based upon a lot of these cases that
talks about judgment, rights and remedies, none of them
which are applicable. lilld, in my view, we go no
further, because Rule 58 does not give the Court the
authority to go into a final judgment out of the State
of Utah based upon an action involving a separate party.
i\nd the reason that that's very clear is that when
you have a case that's a final judgment, everything that
goes underneath is irrelevant. It's absolutely
irrelevant The judgment on its face says this is the
debtor's. They're not entitled to a credit, because
it's not their asset i\nd really that's all that needs
to be done in this case.
The rest of it is the Part 2 that I was talking
about, if the -- that I would mention to the Court, is
that what ability wuuld the Court have had they filed an
5
that's really the point here. The point is that they
wouldn't be entitled to any relief under that section,
because the judgment, number one -- as we've already
said, they don't have an interest in the property that's
involved. But number two is that the suit, if you
do -- if the Court were to look past the judgment
itself, tried to get past that concept of res judicata
and merger -- because when that judgment's entered, all
of the causes of actions underneath are gone. They're
no longer active. They don't exist. They're all merged
into the judgment. We've cited some case law on that.
Res judicata applies, says your claims, even your
defenses, if you would have brought -- that you could
have brought at the prior action are gone. They don't
exist.
So in this action, they're saying, "Well, we need
you to go back and essentially reopen the case." I
don't think they're entitled to that inquiry. In order
to get into this type of inquiry as to whether or not
it's equitable for this to occur, the Court's going to
have to effectively go in and reopen the case.
VY'bat I mean by that is not only "Win the Court have
to say, "You've demonstrated an appropriate ground under
Rule 60(b)(5), and that you would be entitled to relief
had the -- if you go back to the issues that were
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appropriate motion or a different motion to look into
that issue? Wen, I dontt think it does~ Number one is
they vvould have to file either a motion to set aside the
default, probably in the State of Utah, and/ or a Rule 58
motion for relief.
There's nothing that they would be entitled to,
however, had they filed such a motion. The only motion
that would cover that type of relief would be Rule 55 to
set aside a default. That involves a whole different
issue, because they defaulted on a Utah action.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to address-MR. ROBISON: Ohviously.
THE COURT: -- setting aside a default from Utah.
MR. ROBISON: Right. If they came and said, "Well,
we need relief from the judgment under Rule
60(b)" -- and there is a section under 60(b) that says
that the judgment -- the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable the party should have any
prospective application.
Now, that -- again, is that motion in Utah or is
that motion in Idaho? There is some case law that we've
cited that talks about that Idaho should give full faith
and credit to whatever Utah does. But I don't think
6
litigated," well, that's not the case here. The
complaint was filed for three causes of action: The
guaranty, fraud and for unjust enrichment. They
defaulted. They didn't raise any defenses. They had
the right to raise defenses. They could have raised a
defense vvith regard to collateral. They could have
raised a defense ,"vith, "Judge, this is not what the
guaranty allows." They didn't do it. Therefore, the
decision of the Utah court on the default is final.
Final as to those issues.
So the Court's inquiry would be limited in that
scenario just to res judicata and merger. They're gone.
This idea that, "Well, these all arose out of one
transaction," is irrelevant. Once that judgment's been
entered, it's merged. The causes of actions are merged.
The issues are merged. They're barred under res
judicata.
The issues that -- and probably the same issues vvith
BTG. They have a judgment against them for money.
Probably it's not a final judgment, but it may be -- it
may be a bar as to the amount of that claim. But that's
really not the point. The point here is to the credit
they want against the Araves' judgment.
So let's assume that the Court said, "Okay. Well,
I'm going to go further." i\nd I know the Court's very
8
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fair, and there's a lot of discussion in its decision
about equity and so on and so forth. Well, under this
situation, the defendants wouldn't be entitled to any
equity, in our view, because they've been adjudicated
that they misrepresented this loan. They've got a fraud
count against them right now. So how can they come to
the Court and ask for equity when they've been
adjudicated that this loan was fraudulent. They
misrepresented the terms of the loan right in the
complaint. It's right there.
So they've come to Court with clean hands. So this
portion that says that it's no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application wouldn't
apply to them because it isn't equitable. If they were
to try to make that inquiry and the Court have a hearing
on that point, you can bet you that the lender is going
to come in and say, "I would have never made them list
loan had I known the true facts."
So I don't think that would be applicable to give
them a relief. Moreover that, is that, again, they're
trying to do this to entitle them to a credit. The only
basis they can argue for a credit is under the guaranty.
However, the judgment also covers fraud. It also covers
unjust enrichment.
Now, the judgment, they argue, "Well, you have to
9
interpretation, they've allowed that to be utilized for
waivers with regard to the deficiency -- the
anti-deficiency statute under the code. And
incidentally, essentially all Gaige says is that there's
no statutory basis for the guarantor for protection
under that statute. That's really all it says.
And so it does have some applicability but not in
this case. I think what it says is that the debtor who
owns the real property has that right but not the
guarantor. i\nd that's not the basis -- I think that's
where counsel's -- prior counsel got off base.
For example, on page 6 of our memorandum, in the
Valley Bank versus Larson, it says a guarantor may
legany contract to waive a defense provided by the
anti-deficiency statute in that case. Then they went
through others where they waived the right to a
discharge under Utah law, where they waived the right to
release ofthe principal debtor, to impairment of
collateral.
Those cases we've all cited to the Court as examples
of where a waiver -- the reason that's important is
this: In looking at equity, the question is whether the
Court, even if it was to get into this inquiry, would
they go so far to the point where they say, "Look, the
waiver -- your waivers that you made here don't matter"?
11
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have additional damages for that." No, you don't. The
amount of the judgment is correct as to all three
counts. The judgment -- final judgment says, in fact,
that plaintiff shall have final judgment on all of its
counts. Admitted in final judgment, dated March 1st,
2012, plaintiff, International Real Estate Solutions
Inc., be awarded judgment on all of its causes of
actions against the defendants, individually and
severally, as follows: Of all of its causes of actions.
So even if it was entitled to a credit under the
guaranty, they're not entitled to a credit under these
other causes of actions. Again, that's res judicata.
That's been decided. Those are merged into the
decision.
But let's take it one step further. If you get into
the guaranty itself, they've waived that right. And the
real question to the Court is that if we -- if the
guaranty shows a waiver of those rights, is there
any -- under Idaho law, are those rights enforceable?
Well, in our first memorandum, we went through a
whole -- there was a list of cases or a series of cases
that we went through in which the waiver had been
allowed in those cases. And that is -- there's a
variety of these cases in which the Court has basically
said, if you -- ifit's clear it's a matter of contract
10
Because I don't think that's what Idaho law would allow
the COUlt to do, because the waivers are enforceable.
And if they're not, then you're going to have a whole
lot of lenders who are hanging on to these guaranties
that they make and fashion for their ovm purposes,
they're going to be very unhappy about the loss of those
waivers. And really there's no basis for it. These are
commercial transactions. This is money loaned for
commercial purposes. It's not consumer rights. There's
no statutory protection for lenders or for borrowers on
a commercial transaction.
So they can fashion these guaranties. And they do.
It's -- the guaranties that commercial banks prepare are
immense, 19, 20 pages. And the reason they do that is
they are trying to go to the guarantor and say, "Look,
we don't want to get the piece of property back We
want you to pay us." That's really what they're saying.
And if you take a look at this specific guaranty,
there's -- there is waiver of these rights that they're
claiming right now, the right to set these off. At page
10 -- I've taken portions of the guaranty and cited them
in page 10, 11 and 12 of our initial memorandum. And
that's where the query is to the Court: Would the
Court, in view of those waivers, even grant them the
remedy? Had they adjudicated this in Utah, would they
12
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have been entitled to anything in Utah?
Number one, they didn't. They allowed a default to
be entered. Effectively, in my view, they waived that
defense. They don't have any right to come to this
Court and say, "Oh, I didn't litigate down there. I
should have. And, geez, I'm in a pickle here. It's not
fair."
Well, I think if the judgment's been done, right or
wrong, it's over. I don't think you get another bite at
the apple. If you didn't raise it at the district court
level or the court level down in Utah, it's over.
In the guaranty, paragraph 2, it says it is a
guarantee of full payment. It says that the guarantor
will pay to lender the full amount, or perform in full,
such obligations. All payment under this guaranty shall
be made to the lender in la'vviul money of the United
States. They waive all of guarantor's obligations will
be paid and performed by guarantor without counterclaim,
deduction, defense deferment, reduction or offset.
That's just in paragraph 2. I don't think the Court has
to go any further. It's an unconditional guaranty.
Paragraph 5: The guaranty's absolute, continuing,
irrevocable and unconditional. This is a guarantee of
payment and performance when due, not of collection. If
it was a guarantee of collection, that means the lender
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follows: "Guarantor waives any and all present and
futme claims, remedies, and rights of guarantor
against ... any collateral, and any other property,
interests in the property, or rights to property of
borrower." Done. They've waived any rights to them.
Number two, they also waive any rights "arising from
any application of any collateral or any other property,
interests in property...to payment or performance of the
obligation." "Obligation" in here is a capitalized
word. It's a word of art. On page 1 of the guaranty,
"obligation" means payment of the debtor's obligations.
Obligation means the following: Payment of
principal, interests, costs, expenses, fees or other
amounts under the note. Payment of all other amounts
payable from time to time by borrower under the loan
documents and the prompt and complete performance of the
obligations of borrower as set forth in the note.
They've waived all rights to application of payments to
those obligations.
Part 3: "Othen'lise arising in respect to the loan
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would have to pmsue its remedies against the debtor and
then come to t.hem for payment. Well, that wasn't the
agreement they had. They waived that.
In talking about acts and omissions of lender not
affecting this guaranty, one of them is regarding
collateral. That would be S(d)(vii): "Lender may
assemble, sell, or othenvise dispose of any collateral
in any manner and order lender determines in sole and
absolute discretion, and disposition may be for no
value," zero, "or less than fair market value, of the
collateral in the sole and absolute discretion of
lender. Guarantor's sole right with respect to all
collateral shall be to bid at the sale thereof in
accordance ",,'ith applicable law."
In other words, they could protect themselves
against the sale of the collateral by coming in to the
bid. That would be a cash bid. That cash probably
could be -- they could bid that even on behalf of the
debtor, whatever they want to do, but they could get
some credit under those instances. But that would be,
under the guaranty, a cash payment.
But that's also before judgments were ever entered.
I know this is your remedy. Your sole remedy is against
the collateral. The big waiver is in 6(g). And I
didn't underline it, and I should have. And it says as
14
contribution, exoneration." And that's what they're
asking for here. Exoneration is the common law
principle that if you -- if a debt is paid that you owe,
you're exonerated from payment of that debt.
Exoneration's been waived.
So there's nothing left for them to claim. What
their rights were and what their rights are, when you
enter into a guaranty -- a commercial guaranty of this
natme, what your rights are as the guarantor is you've
waived all your rights with respect to the collateral to
the performances but that are expected of the note.
Your guaranty is a separate individual distinct
contract. Their rights are to do this: To pay the
note, and then pursue their subrogated rights against
the debtor.
In this instance, they could have bid at the sale on
collateral. And three, they could have redeemed. They
had the right of redemption. If they didn't think that
the sale was correct, they should have gone in and
redeemed. They could have redeemed under the basis had

24

documents, regardless of whether such claim, remedies,
and rights under any present or futme agreement,
document, or instruments are provided by any law,
ordinance, regulation, or rule (federal, state or local)

24

So it's a materially different contract that they're
asking for. It isn't justthe fact that these came out

25

(including, without limitation, any and all rights of
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of the same obligation and, geez, it's not fair. These

22

23

15

22
23

they paid the note. They could have been subrogated to
the interest of the property ovvner.
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guys have -- they've taken this guy's property. We
should get a credit. Harl they litigated that, which
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they didn't, is the number one point -- had they
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I cited one case out of Oldahoma. Oklahoma had a lot
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litigated it, it wouldn't apply. And number three,
there's stm two other counts here that they got
to -- they have to demonstrate that they would be
entitled to a relief under as well.
And really what the Court is, you know -- you know,
of -- the Idaho courts relied a lot on the Oldahoma
cases in citing. The one case that they had a problem
with was the case I cited out of Oklahoma dealing with
fraud. And I think it's the Arrow -- Red Arrow case.
But the reason we cited that was not because of the
factual circumstances but because the Court's analysis
in there says, "No, no, no. The cause of action, the
damages, are all distinct and different from the
promissory note. They're not the same thing."
That's just an illustration. I think it just is -it has good logic and reasoning behind it, and it makes
an illustration for the Court to look at tvith regard to
those analyses. Even if the Court needed that to
understand the difference between the counts.
But whatthey're attempting to do is get out ofthe
deal they made. They're trying to collaterally attack

1 thisjudgmentthrough circumstances saying it's not
2 fair. Well, it is fair. It's what they agreed to.
3 It's just that simple.
With the judgment, the lender should not be having
4
5 to go through this process proving value, collateral, or
6 anything else. That's not what their position is at
7

this point. Their position of the Araves is because

8

they didn't defend. They didn't do anything in Utah.

9 They let a judgment go to default. Now they're -- the
10 consequences are coming here. But the problem is there
11 are consequences for that failure to defend. And that's
12 res judicata, merger. Those concepts. The promissory
13 note, the guaranties -- definitely the guaranty just
14 doesn't exist.
15
So I don't think the Court's in a position,
16 certainly not based upon the Boller case, to jump into
17 all of that. And even if they -- even if they were to
18

get into that issue, we'd be essentially retrying the
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case. Thank you.
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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MR. ROBISON: Thank you.

8

further.

the BTG case still goes forward, doesn't it?
MR. ROBISON: It doesn't have to.
THE COURT: Because?
MR. ROBISON: The creditor, if they do, then the BTG
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is entitled to the protections under the statute for

2 anti-deficiency and so forth. That's a whole different
3 issue. But we've never moved to proceed to go to
4 judgment. They can walk away from it. They can just
5 leave it. And, franldy, there's no reason to go

THE COURT: Let me ask you: If I were to agree \vith
you on this issue, that might end the Arave case, but

approach with the complaint in the Utah case.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ARMSTRONG: The point is made thatthere was no
defense in that action for an offset for amounts that
would be collected under the promissory note. Buttake
a look at paragraph 19 of the Utah complaint. And I've
underlined it, and I've put an asterisk by it.
This is the allegation by the plaintiff in this

10

THE COURT: Mr. Armstrong.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, your Honor.

9 case, in the Utah case. It says, "Plaintiff is starting
10 the process to foreclose its security interest in the

11

Your Honor is well apprised of the facts in this

11
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case. We've already had a full-day evidentiary hearing

16
17

on the motion that we filed to compel the filing of a
full satisfaction of judgment. And I want to take a
step back and look at what it is really that Mr. Robison
is arguing on behalf of his client.
And I think it's summed up, as he stated, the number

property." And then here's the operative

12 sentence -- and this is an allegation that was found to
13 be a true allegation by virtue of the default judgment.
14 It says, "Any judgment obtained prior to the property
15 being foreclosed should be offset by the amount received
16 by the plaintiff at the foreclosure sale."
17
What does that mean? Well, the judgment that was

18

one point that he makes in his motion, and the number

18

19

one reason why this Court is urged to reconsider its
earlier decision from November of 2012 is because my

19 believe Mr. Robison read from that, and I believe it's
20 been attached to some of the pleadings in these matters.
21 There was a totaljudgmentthat was found in that Utah
22 action for $372,138.13. Now there was a principal
23 component of that judgment, as well as late fees. There
24 was an interest component, and then there was some
25 attorney's fees.
20
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clients didn't appear in the Utah court to litigate this
issue relative to the claim for fraud and default under
the guaranty agreements that they had signed. There was
no reason for them to do that.
And the reason I say that, your Honor -- in can

19

reached in the Utah case, the final judgment -- and I
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The plaintiff in this case makes a huge deal out of
the fact that my clients didn't show up in the Utilh
action and defend on this issue of offset. Well -- and
thereby res judicata somehow precludes them from coming
into this court and raising the issue of offset.
Well, your Honor, the offset and my client's ability
to raise that as a defense was decided in the Utah
action by virtue of the complaint in the Utah action.
The plaintiff alleged that we were entitled to an offset
by any amounts that were obtained by that foreclosure
action.
And I think what that means, your Honor, is -- just
as you had found in the November 2012 decision, is
they're not entitled to a double recovery. They're
entitled to be made whole on the judgment that they
obtained. And the judgment that they obtained from Utah
is directly ,"!hat's at issue in this case and whether
they've been fully satisfied on that judgment.
And so I think it really is -- if anyi:hing, I think
that the plaintiff in this case would be precluded under
res judicata from arguing that offset is not an issue or
that we're not entitled to offset, because the plaintiff
in the Utah case claimed we were entitled to that
offset.
The case that's cited by the plaintiff that I think
21
from two debtors, but both debts arise out of the same
occurrence, the payment by one extinguishes the judgment
for all other judgment debtors. And where less than the
full amount is paid, compensation paid to the plaintiff
by one indebted is deducted from the award obtained from
another."
That's this case, your Honor. This is not some
complicated trust deed foreclosure -- non-judicial
foreclosure proceeding. The anti-deficiency statute has
no relevance here. This is a simple judgment
collection. The jUdgment's been satisfied from my
client's standpoint by virtue of that foreclosure, the
execution -- the writ of execution to sell that
property.
The point -- and I don't want to rehash this, your
Honor, but in the reply, the big point made in the reply
by the plaintiff here is that in the Utah action, the
Araves could have asserted in defense the claim that
they were entitled to a credit upon the sale of the
collateral. But they failed to do so.
Once again, your Honor, I can't stress it enough
that that point has been decided by virtue of the
default judgment. They pled the credit that we were
entitled to in the complaint, paragraph 19. And by
entering that default judgment on each of the
23
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is really relied upon is this Oklahoma decision. And
the Oklahomfl dp.cisioD is completely different than the
action that we have here. We've got a simple judgment
collection action pending here in Idaho against judgment
debtors who reside in Idaho.
The various judgment debtors at issue before your
Honor that we're seeking a full satisfaction of judgment
on, they all reside in Idaho. The assets for collection
are here in Idaho. And that's what the plaintiff is
seeking to do. And that's all we're asking this Court
to do through our motion to compel the filing of the
full satisfaction of judgment is to find that that
judgment has been satisfied through that foreclosure
proceeding on that Blackfoot property.
iilld your Honor got it right on November -- on
November 8th, 2012, when you found -- when this Court
found that the anti-deficiency statute doesn't apply in
this case. Gaige doesn't apply in this case. This is a
very simple case.
And I'll just quote from your Honor's decision, "A
party may pursue one or all of the remedies so long as
he obtains but one satisfaction. And the rationale for
this rule is that the remedy provided to an injured
person is to receive only one full compensation for the
wrong done to him. Thus when a party has two judgments
22
allegations in that complaint, I would argue, your
Honor, that the plaintiff is judicially estopped from
arguing otherwise. They've asserted one theory in the
Utah action, and now they're coming into your Honor's
courtroom to assert another theory. I think they're
judicially estopped from doing that.
And I think that's all I have, your Honor, unless
your Honor has any questions.
THE COURT: No, I do not.
Mr. Robison, 1'd like to hear from you regarding
this paragraph 19.
MR. ROBISON: Yes, your Honor.
Your Honor, it's nice, but it doesn't apply. In the
first place, you know, we're looking at the general
allegations of the complaint. And just -- and also, I
would point out that attached to the complaint is also
Exhibit A, which is the guaranty, and all of that.
And again, once it goes to judgment, that all
merges. The Court does not find when you go through the
complaint -- just because you make an allegation and
t..~en a final judgment comes up, you don't go back to the
complaint to see what the force and effect of the
judgment is. You go look at the judgment. The
judgment's a money judgment on all causes of action.
All three causes of action, which are first, second and
24
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third. There's been no adjudication under that section
2
referenced in the judgment whatsoever.
Number two is that 'while they -- are they suggesting
3
that they were somehow misled so they didn't defend? If
4
5
so, that still takes you back to Rule 62(b). You're
6
going to have to make some motion that they were misled.
But it doesn't -- it wouldn't apply anyvvay, because the
7
allegation was there. And then you have to carefully
8
read what was being said there. It says, "Any judgment
9
obtained prior to the property being foreclosed should
10
be offset by the amount received by the plaintiff at the
11
foreclosure sale." It says they're starting the
12
process.
13
Number one -- and then they allege in 20, right
14
after, "explicitly give notice to the defense that
15
pursuant to USCA 57.132 (sic) that plaintiff intends to
116
seek full recovery pursuant to the terms of the note and
17
guaranty" -- and guaranty -- "and it reserves the right
18
to amend its complaint after foreclosure sale to comply
19
with the provisions of 57-1-32."
20
And by the "vay, it was not applicable to this case,
21
because 57-1-32 is the statute which deals with the
22
property owner's right upon the sale of foreclosure of
23
trustee. The property owner wasn't even a party to this
24
action.
25

So not only was it not adjudicated, any of those
allegations were merged, it doesn't change a single
thing on the res judicata analysis and the merging
analysis. Nothing's changed at alL What we have is a
jUdgment on its face. The question is: What's the
authority for the Court to get past that?
There certainly isn't any under Rule 58, and there
certainly isn't anything under the Boller case. There's
just no authority there for the Court. That's the only
motion we have in front of the Court.
Now, the rest of this is ongoing, was not at the
behest of the plaintiff. We didn't ask to go pursue a
deficiency judgment in the BIG case (sic). That's being
done -- that was being done based upon the Court's
decision, which we would request the Court to reconsider
and deny.
THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, I do think
there's enough here that I need to take it under
advisement. I'll issue a written decision. Because I'm
taking it under advisement, we're going to lose our
May 2nd date. There's no way around that.
MR. ROBISON: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: We're going to lose it.
MR. ROBISON: Yeah. I figured you would.
THE COURT: And to be very honest with you, it's not
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just because I'm taking this under advisement, but it's
because I have a brand new grandbaby and a son who's
graduating from law school in Georgetown, and I'm going
to be there.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Very good. We understand.
THE COURT: The May 2nd date will go off. I'll get
a decision out within the 30 days, and we'll go from
there.
MR. ROBISON: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. AIL\1STRONG: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(Proceeding adjourned at 3:33 P.M.)

14
15
16
17

26

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2

3

4
I, STEPHANIE MORSE, Certified Shorthand
5 Reporter #708, State of Idaho, do hereby certify that
6 the foregoing transcript, consisting of Pages 1 to 27,
7 inclusive, is a true and accurate record of the
8 proceedings had on the date and at the time indicated
9 therein as stenographically reported by me to the best
10 of my ability, and contains all of the material
11 designated in the notice of appeaL
12
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
13 hand and seal this 51h day of September, 2013.
14
15
16
-~

17

18

STEPHANIE MORSE, RPR, CSR

18

19

19

20

20

21

21

22

23

22
23

24

24

25

25
27

28

